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THEIR HOME IS NOT THEIR CASTLE: SUBSIDIZED
HOUSING’S INTRUSION INTO FAMILY PRIVACY
AND DECISIONAL AUTONOMY *
MICHELLE Y. EWERT **
The anti-Black racism that has permeated public benefits programs and federal
housing policy for over a century persists in subsidized rental housing. Public
housing authorities (“PHAs”) impede the ability of tenants—who are
disproportionately Black women—to change household composition as their
family situations change. PHAs routinely take months or longer to approve
requests to add or remove household members and often require tenants to
produce inaccessible third-party verification of a former household member’s
new address before removing them from official records. In failing to grant these
requests promptly, PHAs infringe on tenants’ fundamental right to privacy and
family autonomy, impose a financial burden on tenants who have limited
resources, and put tenants at risk of eviction if former household members are
arrested for criminal activity.
This Article proposes workable solutions to these problems. First, PHA failure
to timely respond to a request to adjust household composition should be treated
as a constructive denial, as is done in fair housing law and other areas of
administrative law. This strategy would allow tenants to pursue administrative
and judicial review rights that already exist in public housing and the housing
choice voucher program. Second, the statutory or regulatory schemes governing
subsidized housing should be amended to include subpoena powers such as those
that exist in the Administrative Procedure Act to allow tenants to access needed
third-party records. These changes would protect the substantive and due process
rights of vulnerable tenants and help dismantle the systemic racism that
continues to plague public benefits programs.
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INTRODUCTION
After living in public housing for more than seven years, Mary Harris
asked the Housing Authority of Norwalk to remove two adult daughters from
her lease. 1 One daughter, Kim, had recently married. 2 Another daughter, Mary

1. Hous. Auth. of Norwalk v. Harris, No. SPNO 9009-10295, 1991 WL 270285, at *1–2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 1991), rev’d sub nom. 611 A.2d 934 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 625 A.2d 816
(Conn. 1993).
2. Id. at *1.
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Jr., had moved in with her boyfriend. 3 The housing authority removed Kim
from the lease but did not remove Mary Jr. because Ms. Harris had no thirdparty verification of her new address. 4 Mary Jr. was subsequently arrested for
drug possession. 5 The housing authority then filed an eviction case against Ms.
Harris for “nuisance” violations based on her daughter’s alleged criminal
activity. 6 A lengthy legal battle ensued.
While Ms. Harris was ultimately able to keep her housing, it took the
assistance of several lawyers and an appeal to the Connecticut Appellate Court
to resolve the matter. 7 Further, the appellate decision did not address the issue
of the housing authority’s failure to remove Mary Jr. from household records
or its requirement that tenants produce third-party proof of new residence
before allowing a tenant to remove a household member from the lease. 8
Unfortunately, Ms. Harris’s story is not an isolated incident. Similar
policies and practices requiring third-party verification of changes in household
composition exist in public housing authorities (“PHAs”) across the country
and radically restrict the ability of tenants to shape their family life. 9 Indeed,
tenants often wait many months for PHAs to process their requests to add or
remove household members from official records and many are unable to obtain
counsel to challenge PHA actions. 10
Ms. Harris’s experience, and other subsidized tenants’ inability to decide
their own familial dynamic, is deeply demeaning and tramples on recognized
liberty interests. Ms. Harris was deemed guilty by association for actions that
had nothing to do with her household. 11 She was deprived of a voice as her
request to change the composition of her household was summarily ignored.
And she was only able to continue living in her home because she had the good
fortune to have access to counsel. Those less fortunate than Ms. Harris,
suffering a similar fate, must bear the harmful consequences of a wrongful
eviction they have no real means to prevent. PHA mishandling of requests to

3. Id. at *2.
4. Id.
5. Id. at *1.
6. Id.
7. See Hous. Auth. of Norwalk v. Harris, 611 A.2d 934, 938 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 625
A.2d 816 (Conn. 1993).
8. See id. at 935 (noting that the issue on appeal was whether the housing authority was required
to include a specific type of notice giving Ms. Harris twenty-one days to rectify the misuse of her
public housing).
9. See generally, e.g., TOPEKA HOUS. AUTH., CHANGE IN INCOME OR FAMILY MEMBERS
(2018), https://www.tha.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Income-Packet-Change-Booklet-112018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MJK-U5N5] (requiring residents to fill out nine pages of forms to receive approval
for a change in household membership and supply numerous supporting documents).
10. See infra Section I.D (discussing the harms of PHA delays and long processing times).
11. See Hous. Auth. of Norwalk, 611 A.2d at 937–38.
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add or remove household members literally brings home the weight of structural
racism to those who suffer from it the most—poor Black women. 12
This Article argues that PHA procedures to add or remove household
members deprive subsidized tenants of fundamental privacy and family
formation rights. These rights, which protect parenting, partnering, and choices
related to household composition, have been repeatedly upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court as fundamental to human dignity. 13 PHA practices consciously,
consistently, and conspicuously violate these very rights of subsidized tenants
by interfering with their ability to parent, partner, and choose the family
structure they want. Further, these PHA practices constitute procedural due
process violations. Low-income tenants are effectively denied redress when
PHAs fail to issue written, appealable decisions or require action the tenants
cannot possibly take.
This Article argues a point that should be accepted without question:
people who live in subsidized housing—disproportionately Black women—
must be no less secure in their constitutional rights than other people. For this
to be more than wishful thinking, the demeaning procedures imposed upon
these tenants by PHAs must change. Tenants must be able to treat a PHA’s
failure to respond as a constructive denial, triggering formal administrative and
judicial review rights. Further, the federal government must revise subsidized
housing programs to include subpoena power to compel witness attendance and
the production of third-party records at hearings. Adopting these approaches
would create administrative and judicial avenues for low-income tenants in
subsidized housing to exercise more control over the lives of their families, thus
protecting their fundamental rights.
Addressing this gap in the enforcement of constitutional rights of
subsidized tenants is urgent because housing is already a precarious resource for
low-income individuals, and low-income Black women in particular. 14 Matthew
Desmond’s work studying renters in Milwaukee helps illuminate the challenges
facing low-income renters around the country. 15 The Milwaukee Area Renters
Study found that twenty percent of Black female renters had been evicted at
some point during their adult lives, in contrast to just over eight percent of

12. See Matthew Desmond, Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118 AM. J. SOCIO. 88,
104 (2012) [Desmond, The Reproduction of Urban Poverty] (“[B]lack women are ‘marked’ by eviction at
higher rates—collecting evictions on their records— . . . [and] are exposed to the hardship of eviction
at higher rates as well. Black women are more likely to be evicted on paper and in practice.”).
13. See infra Section II.A.
14. See, e.g., Desmond, The Reproduction of Urban Poverty, supra note 12, at 90, 120–21; Matthew
Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City
Women, 78 AM. SOCIO. REV. 117, 137–38 (2012).
15. See Desmond, The Reproduction of Urban Poverty, supra note 12, at 120–21.
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Latinx female renters and just under seven percent of White female renters. 16
Poverty alone cannot explain this disparate impact. The eviction rate in poor
White neighborhoods is nowhere near as high as in poor Black neighborhoods. 17
What does begin to explain the disparate impact is overpolicing. Police
harassment of Black communities directly impacts the housing rights of Black
women. It was the arrest (not the conviction) of Ms. Harris’s daughter, Mary
Jr., that put the eviction proceeding against Ms. Harris in motion. 18 Racial
profiling by police and disparate prosecution for drug offenses put families of
color in more frequent contact with the criminal justice system than their White
counterparts. 19 The link between these arrests (not convictions) and housing
security through breach of lease cases is shameful. 20 It is even more upsetting
when the person arrested by the police no longer lives in the household later
subject to eviction.
Arrests and evictions in the past make it harder to find stable housing in
the future. In discussing the systemic barriers to stable housing, Matthew
Desmond says, “Because [B]lack men [are] disproportionately incarcerated and
[B]lack women disproportionately evicted, uniformly denying housing to
applicants with recent criminal or eviction records [has] an incommensurate
impact on African Americans.” 21 Tragically, systemic racism built into
subsidized rental housing programs often makes housing intended for the most
16. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 299
(2016) [hereinafter DESMOND, EVICTED].
17. Id. at 359 (“In Milwaukee’s poorest [B]lack neighborhoods, 1 male renter in 33 was evicted
through the court system each year, compared to 1 male renter in 134 and 1 female renter in 150 in the
city’s poorest [W]hite neighborhoods.”).
18. See Hous. Auth. of Norwalk v. Harris, No. SPNO 9009-10295, 1991 WL 270285, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 1991), rev’d sub nom. 611 A.2d 934 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 625 A.2d 816
(Conn. 1993).
19. For discussions of racial profiling and disparate arrest rates, see generally MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
(2010) (discussing racial profiling, pretextual police stops, and disparities in arrest rates for drug crimes
by race); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84
MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999) (analyzing racial profiling and pretextual stops in Ohio and other states
through resident interviews, court statistics, and other studies); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by
Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
296 (2001) (discussing data and law enforcement justifications for racial profiling); Floyd D.
Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of African-American Males: Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional
Protection, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 439 (2004) (reviewing case law and studies related to racial
profiling of Black men).
20. For analysis of the link between incarceration and homelessness, see CATERINA GOUVIS
ROMAN & JEREMY TRAVIS, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, TAKING STOCK: HOUSING HOMELESSNESS,
AND PRISONER REENTRY, at iii–iv (2004); LEGAL ACTION CENTER, HELPING MOMS, DADS &
KIDS TO COME HOME: ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO HOUSING FOR PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL
RECORDS 1–2 (2016); STEPHEN METRAUX, CATERINA G. ROMAN & RICHARD S. CHO,
INCARCERATION AND HOMELESSNESS 9–8 (2007); Brianna Remster, A Life Course Analysis of
Homeless Shelter Use Among the Formerly Incarcerated, 36 JUST. Q. 437, 437 (2019).
21. DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 16, at 252.
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vulnerable people unattainable, and even after admission to subsidized housing,
tenants are subject to PHA procedures that threaten the stability of their living
situation. 22
Under federal regulations, subsidized housing tenants must receive
permission from the PHA to add or remove a household member. 23 The
rationale for this policy is reasonable. Because PHAs use total household
income to determine the tenant’s share of rent, they must know the composition
of the household so they can include everyone in the income calculation. 24
Additionally, federal law prohibits admission of people with certain criminal
backgrounds into subsidized housing. 25 PHAs must therefore screen potential
household members to determine eligibility. This policy becomes problematic,
however, when PHAs fail to respond in a timely way to requests to add or
remove household members. 26
Since federal law imposes no time limits by which PHAs must respond to
household change requests, many PHAs wait months, if not longer, to approve
or deny requests. 27 Further, requirements that tenants produce third-party
verification of a former household member’s new residence can prevent the
processing of a removal request, since many subsidized tenants do not have
access to the necessary third-party records. 28 These practices can—and do—lead
to homelessness for some.
When PHAs fail to respond to requests to remove someone from the
official records, there are serious consequences to the tenants. They pay higher
than necessary rent because the income of the former household member is still
included when calculating household income. 29 Similarly, if a former household
member is arrested for criminal activity, that activity can be imputed to the
household, as happened to Ms. Harris, putting the tenant at risk for eviction
even though that former household member no longer lives in the unit. The
financial costs and risk of eviction can be devastating to the family.
22. See infra Section II.C (discussing institutionalized racism as one barrier to accessing public
benefits for families of color); see also infra Section III.B (discussing procedural due process deficits in
subsidized housing).
23. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.257(b)(2), 982.551(h) (2020).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(1).
25. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.204(a), 982.553(a) (2020).
26. Many private landlords also conduct criminal background checks on applicants and new
household members and screen for income; some of those private landlords are likely also slow in
responding to tenant requests to adjust household composition. See, e.g., David Thatcher, The Rise of
Criminal Background Screening in Rental Housing, 33 J.L. & SOC. INQUIRY 5 (2008). However, this
Article focuses on unreasonable delays by PHAs in screening new household members and approving
household composition changes.
27. See infra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing how the Housing Authority of Baltimore
City took four months to issue a decision about removal of a household member).
28. See infra note 269 (discussing the use of third-party records and third-party verification).
29. See infra note 347 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that PHAs often do not adjust
rent after changes in the household).
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PHA failure to respond to a request to add a household member is equally
harmful because it means that the new family member cannot legally join the
household. Tenants who allow the person to move in without PHA permission
risk eviction for having an unauthorized occupant. If they wait for official
permission, the partner or other family member might have to wait months
before moving into the unit, destabilizing family life.
This Article proposes necessary solutions to these problems. It proceeds
in three parts. Part I focuses on subsidized rental housing, describing the
obligation of PHAs to screen applicants and calculate household income. Then,
it examines the problems stemming from the failure of PHAs to approve
requests to change household composition in a timely manner. Part II discusses
case law establishing fundamental rights related to family privacy and
autonomy. It then contrasts these rights with the long history of government
regulation of low-income families of color through restrictions on family
formation during and after slavery as well as discriminatory public benefits
programs in the modern era. This Article shows how constitutional violations
against Black women are inherent in the social safety net, including subsidized
housing. Part III argues that the PHA requirement to produce often
unattainable third-party verification and unreasonably long response times for
requests to change household composition violate procedural due process. To
address these due process problems, this part proposes that unreasonable delays
be treated as constructive denials, triggering administrative and judicial review
rights, just as unreasonable delays are addressed in fair housing law and other
areas of administrative law. This part further proposes the creation of subpoena
power such as the one existing under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”). 30
I. PHA PROCEDURE FOR ADDING OR REMOVING HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS
The United States Housing Act of 1937 31 created a mechanism for the
federal government to “provide financial assistance to the States and political
subdivisions thereof for the elimination of unsafe and insanitary housing
conditions, for the eradication of slums, [and] for the provision of decent, safe,
and sanitary dwellings for families of low income.” 32 Through the 1937 act, the
government set up the framework for the public housing program, which it later
expanded through the Housing Act of 1949. 33 Twenty-five years after that
30. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
31. Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
32. Id. at 888.
33. Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1701h and in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). In the public housing program, local PHAs own and operate rental units,
including scattered site single-family homes and multi-family complexes. See HUD’s Public Housing
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expansion, Congress further expanded federal subsidized rental housing to
include the voucher program, first known as “Section 8” and now known as the
Housing Choice Voucher Program (“HCVP”). 34
Subsidized housing is a critical part of the social safety net for low- and
moderate-income households. According to the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (“HUD”), over 800,000 households in the United States,
encompassing nearly 1.7 million people, were assisted by public housing in the
reporting period from March 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020. 35 During that same
reporting period, over four million people, representing almost two million
households, were assisted by tenant-based voucher programs. 36 People who live
in subsidized housing are able to devote more of their income to health care,
food, and transportation; whereas low-income renters on the private market
have only a fraction of their income available to meet other basic needs after
paying for rent. 37 Desmond’s 2011 study showed that one-third of the tenants
in Milwaukee eviction court spent at least eighty percent of their income on
rent, and a majority spent at least half of their income on rent. 38 Unfortunately,
the COVID-19 pandemic and the attendant economic crisis exacerbated
housing instability, particularly for households of color. 39
Given the incredible rent burden on low-income renters in the private
market, demand for subsidized rental housing far exceeds supply. 40 One report
estimates that the number of existing subsidized housing units could meet the
need of only one quarter of households that were financially eligible for
Program, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/topics/rental_assistance/phprog
[https://perma.cc/3W6X-VEM5]. For a description of the program, see id.
34. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). In the HCVP,
PHAs issue vouchers that allow tenants to rent units on the private rental market at a reduced rate. See
Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/program
_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/hcv/about/fact_sheet [https://perma.cc/2UEA-JKWG]. For
a description of the voucher program, see id.
35. See Resident Characteristics Report, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., https://pic.hud.gov/
pic/RCRPublic/rcrmain.asp [https://perma.cc/6Y4X-R59B].
36. Id.
37. DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 16, at 302.
38. Id. at 97.
39. Yung Chun, Stephen Roll, Selina Miller, Hedwig Lee, Savannah Larimore & Michal
Grinstein-Weiss, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Housing Instability During the COVID-19 Pandemic 4
(Soc. Pol’y Inst. Wash. Univ. St. Louis, Working Paper No. 38, 2020); Yung Chun & Michal
Grinstein-Weiss, Housing Inequality Gets Worse as the COVID-19 Pandemic Is Prolonged, BROOKINGS:
BLOG (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/12/18/housing-inequality-getsworse-as-the-covid-19-pandemic-is-prolonged/ [https://perma.cc/4CKT-AABC]; BRADLEY L.
HARDY & TREVON D. LOGAN, HAMILTON PROJECT, ESSAY 2020-17, RACIAL ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY AMID THE COVID-19 CRISIS 6 (2020), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/
EA_HardyLogan_LO_8.12.pdf [https://perma.cc/A97L-SF2B].
40. DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 16, at 59, 302–03; EDWARD G. GOETZ, NEW DEAL RUINS:
RACE, ECONOMIC JUSTICE, & PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY 45 (2013).
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federally subsidized rental housing. 41 In 2015, around six million households
qualified for HCVP vouchers but did not receive one. 42 Many PHAs have
closed their waiting lists so people in need of subsidized housing cannot even
submit new applications. 43
Limited resources devoted to subsidized rental housing is not the only
reason households have difficulty accessing federally subsidized housing. Over
the years, racial discrimination has played a significant role in shaping these
programs. Early public housing projects were racially segregated. 44 Later public
housing developments were concentrated in low-income neighborhoods of color
rather than dispersed throughout metro areas, which further entrenched
segregation and limited residents’ economic opportunities. 45 Additionally, the
Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration initially refused
to insure mortgages for Black applicants or for applicants of any color in Black
neighborhoods, making it harder for renters of color to become homeowners. 46
The enactment of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) 47 in 1968 prohibited
housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, and national origin. 48
Subsequent amendments to the FHA added sex, disability, and familial status
as protected classes. 49 Further, fair housing law has evolved to recognize

41. Douglas Rice & Barbara Sard, Decade of Neglect Has Weakened Federal Low-Income Housing
Programs, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 9 (Feb. 24, 2009), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/
default/files/atoms/files/2-24-09hous.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM9G-4YCS].
42. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 209 (2017).
43. For example, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City’s waiting lists for public housing and
both HCVP tenant-based and project-based vouchers are currently closed. Public Housing and RAD,
HOUS. AUTH. OF BALT. CITY, https://www.habc.org/habc-information/programs-departments/
public-housing/ [https://perma.cc/LV2J-7Q8E]; HCVP, HOUS. AUTH. OF BALT. CITY, https://
www.habc.org/habc-information/programs-departments/hcvp/
[https://perma.cc/9NNZ-H2GM].
The Chicago Housing Authority’s HCVP waiting list is also closed. Housing Choice Voucher (HCV)
Program, CHI. HOUS. AUTH., https://www.thecha.org/residents/housing-choice-voucher-hcv-program
[https://perma.cc/6CFU-JA7P]. The New York City Housing Authority’s HCVP waiting list has been
closed since December 10, 2009. Applying for Section 8, N.Y.C. HOUS. AUTH., https://www1.nyc.gov/
site/nycha/section-8/applicants.page [https://perma.cc/6HRR-PRN7]; see also DESMOND, EVICTED
supra note 16, at 59 (noting that “the list” to apply for housing voucher assistance in Milwaukee had
not accepted new applicants for more than four years).
44. GOETZ, supra note 40, at 36–37; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 42, at 19.
45. GOETZ, supra note 40, at 31; DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 55–57 (1993).
46. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 45, at 51–64; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 42, at 13.
47. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
48. § 804, 82 Stat. at 83.
49. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808, 88 Stat. 633,
728 (1974) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-5); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-430, § 6, 102 Stat. 1619, 1620 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604).
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disparate impact as a cause of action under federal fair housing law, in addition
to disparate treatment. 50
Despite these growing protections, however, federal housing policies that
produce discriminatory effects still persist. All public housing policies have a
disparate impact on women of color, who are disproportionately represented in
subsidized rental housing. 51 While less than 13% of the U.S. population in 2019
identified as Black (non-Hispanic), 43% percent of public housing residents for
the 2020 reporting period were Black (non-Hispanic). 52 Furthermore,
nationwide in 2019 only 12.3% of households in the United States were femaleheaded family households, but 74% of public housing households in the 2020
reporting period were female headed and 33% were female headed with
children. 53 This means that policies that harm subsidized tenants have a
disproportionately negative impact on Black women. 54 One such policy
involves lengthy delays in PHA approval of changes to household composition.
The rights of subsidized tenants to change household composition exist in
tension with PHAs’ interest in efficiently administering subsidized housing
programs. PHAs have a clear interest in knowing and approving who lives in
subsidized rental units. They want to make sure people who live in subsidized
housing meet federal eligibility requirements and are not a threat to other
tenants or community members. 55 Additionally, they want their tenants to pay
the proper amount of rent. 56

50. After decades of the circuit courts recognizing disparate impact as a cause of action under
federal fair housing law, HUD issued a regulation in 2013 officially recognizing disparate impact as a
theory of liability. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2020). In 2015 the Supreme Court upheld disparate impact as
a cause of action under the FHA. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015).
51. Michelle Y. Ewert, One Strike and You’re Out of Public Housing: How the Intersection of the War
on Drugs and Federal Housing Policy Violates Due Process and Fair Housing Principles, 32 HARV. J. ON
RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 57, 97–101 (2016).
52. Hispanic or Latino Origin by Race, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/
cedsci/table?q=race&d=ACS%201-Year%20Estimates%20Detailed%20Tables&tid=ACSDT1Y2019.B0
3002&hidePreview=false [https://perma.cc/M3ZP-G942]; Picture of Subsidized Households, U.S.
DEP’T. OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/assthsg.html#20092020_data [https://perma.cc/CJ7D-QVHX].
53. Households and Families, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q
=S11&d=ACS%201-Year%20Estimates%20Subject%20Tables&tid=ACSST1Y2019.S1101&hidePrevie
w=false [https://perma.cc/7HCF-Q667]; Picture of Subsidized Households, supra note 52.
54. Ewert, supra note 51, at 97–101.
55. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., OFF. OF PUB. & INDIAN HOUS., OFF. OF PUB.
HOUS. & VOUCHER PROGRAMS, PUB. HOUS. MGMT. & OCCUPANCY DIV., PUBLIC HOUSING
OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK 53 (2003), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/DOC_10760.PDF
[https://perma.cc/2Z5Y-4MTA].
56. See Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., https://www.
hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/hcv/about/fact_sheet [https://perma.cc/
2UEA-JKWG].
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Federal law creates the framework for how PHAs screen applicants and
determine rent. However, as the rest of this part shows, the implementation of
these policies makes it difficult for tenants to easily change household
composition and interferes with their ability to exercise family autonomy.
Because tenants’ fundamental rights are at stake, 57 PHAs must utilize
procedures that protect procedural due process when dealing with requests to
change household composition. The current regulations are inadequate.
A.

Criminal Background Screening

Before admission into subsidized housing, applicants undergo criminal
background checks. 58 The federal regulations governing subsidized rental
housing impose very few requirements for criminal background screening of
applicants and new household members. Indeed, there are only two types of
criminal records that create lifetime ineligibility for subsidized housing under
federal law. First, a person is ineligible for subsidized rental housing for life if
they are subject to a lifetime sex offender registration requirement. 59 Second, a
person is ineligible for life if they have been convicted of manufacturing
methamphetamine on federally subsidized housing property. 60 Other criminal
activity can lead to temporary ineligibility. For example, PHAs must deny
admission to people who are currently engaged in illegal drug use or whose
pattern of illegal drug use “may threaten the health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises by other residents.” 61 PHAs must also deny
admission to people whose current alcohol abuse “may threaten the health,
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents.” 62
Other than these few specific prohibitions, the federal rules governing
subsidized rental housing give PHAs substantial discretion to determine their
own eligibility criteria based on criminal records. 63 Indeed, it is up to local
PHAs to determine what sorts of drug-related criminal activity, violent criminal
activity, or other criminal activity make applicants ineligible to receive a HCVP
voucher. 64 Further, it is up to individual PHAs to determine how far back into
a person’s criminal history they look when determining eligibility for the
voucher program; all the federal regulations require is that the lookback period
57. See infra Part II.
58. 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(a)(2)(i) (2020).
59. Id. §§ 960.204(a)(4), 982.553(a)(2)(i).
60. Id. §§ 960.204(a)(3), 982.553(a)(1)(ii)(C).
61. Id. §§ 960.204(a)(2), 982.553(a)(1)(ii)(B).
62. Id. §§ 960.204(b), 982.553(a)(2)(ii)(C)(3).
63. Id. § 982.553(a)(2)(ii)(A) (“The PHA may prohibit admission . . . .”); id. § 960.202(a)(1)
(“The PHA shall establish and adopt written policies for admission of tenants.”); id. § 960.203(c)
(“[T]he PHA is responsible for screening family behavior and suitability for tenancy. The PHA may
consider . . . .”) (emphasis added).
64. Id. § 982.553(a)(2)(ii)(A).
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is a “reasonable time before the admission.” 65 The federal regulations similarly
give PHAs broad discretion when determining criminal background screening
policies for admission to public housing. The regulations say PHAs may
consider “all relevant information, which may include, but is not limited to . . .
[a] history of criminal activity involving crimes of physical violence to persons
or property and other criminal acts which would adversely affect the health,
safety or welfare of other tenants.” 66
Because of the substantial discretion afforded PHAs, rules vary greatly by
jurisdiction regarding the length of the lookback period and what activity or
criminal case disposition trigger ineligibility. Some PHAs do not distinguish
between misdemeanor or felony charges, and some have lengthy lookback
periods that can be ten years or longer. 67 Other PHAs have relatively short
lookback periods and distinguish between misdemeanors and felonies. 68 These
inconsistencies in screening procedures and the broad discretion afforded to
PHAs lead to unequal access to subsidized housing between jurisdictions,
especially in communities with aggressive racial profiling by law enforcement.
B.

Rent Determinations

PHAs also examine applicants’ household income to determine eligibility
and calculate the tenants’ share of rent. 69 Subsidized rental housing, including
both public housing and the HCVP, is reserved for low-income families. 70 To
65. Id.
66. Id. § 960.203(c)(3).
67. The Lawrence-Douglas County Housing Authority in Kansas looks back five years for both
misdemeanor and felony convictions and also considers arrest without conviction if there is “other
evidence that establishes that the person engaged in disqualifying criminal activity.” LAWRENCEDOUGLAS CNTY. HOUS. AUTH., ADMINISTRATIVE / ACOP PLAN: COMBINED ADMINISTRATIVE
PLAN AND ADMISSION & CONTINUED OCCUPANCY POLICIES AND METHODS OF
ADMINISTRATION FOR ALL LDCHA PROGRAMS 21 (2020), https://storage.googleapis.com/
wzukusers/user-31752601/documents/969aae83f0b34d599f5e30057de77d06/ADMIN-ACOP%20Mast
er%20Copy%20Amended%2010-26-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2DJ-EL7P]. Still other PHAs have
even longer lookback periods. Until as recently as 2016, the Little Rock Housing Authority, also known
as the Metropolitan Housing Alliance, looked back seven years for felony convictions, and a study by
the Sargent Shriver Center on Poverty Law identified many PHAs with lookback periods of ten years
or more. MARIE CLAIRE TRAN-LEUNG, WHEN DISCRETION MEANS DENIAL: A NATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL RECORDS BARRIERS TO FEDERALLY SUBSIDIZED HOUSING 12–13
(2015), https://www.povertylaw.org/article/when-discretion-means-denial/ [https://perma.cc/2CEK9C4J]; METRO. HOUS. ALL., METROPOLITAN HOUSING ALLIANCE: ADMISSIONS AND
CONTINUED OCCUPANCY POLICY 18 (2016), http://lrhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/
ACOP-2016_HUD-Approved.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SUS-GXU2].
68. For example, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City looks back eighteen months for
misdemeanor convictions and three years for felony convictions. HOUS. AUTH. OF
BALT. CITY, PUBLIC HOUSING ADMISSIONS & CONTINUED OCCUPANCY POLICIES 4–15 (2019),
https://www.habc.org/media/2449/the-fy-2021-public-housing-acop_r2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZKE9S2QQ].
69. 24 C.F.R § 5.628(a) (2020).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(1).
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make housing affordable for these low-income tenants, income-based rent is
capped at thirty percent of household adjusted income. 71 The federal
government gives PHAs great discretion in determining what documentation
participants must provide to prove household income under the HCVP. 72 The
regulations governing public housing tenancies are a bit more specific. They
require PHAs to either obtain third-party verification of the household’s
income and assets or to include documentation for why third-party verification
is not available. 73 For both programs, however, PHAs must consider all sources
of income for all household members when calculating household income. 74
Consequently, PHAs must know the identity of everyone in the household to
correctly determine the appropriate amount of rent.
In addition to the threshold income screening that occurs at the time of
admission, PHAs conduct periodic income screenings to make sure rent is still
correct. Generally, these screenings occur on an annual basis. 75 However,
tenants can request interim reexaminations if their household income changes. 76
PHAs have the discretion to determine when and how tenants report income
changes. 77 PHAs might require tenants to provide notification of income
changes in writing or within a certain period of time following the change. For
example, the Lawrence-Douglas County Housing Authority in Kansas requires
tenants to report income changes within ten calendar days of the change. 78
Other PHAs have slightly longer reporting periods, which allow tenants more
time to gather needed documentation to support the request. 79
C.

Proving Household Composition Changes

Because rent is based on total household income and there are restrictions
on who can live in subsidized rental housing, federal regulations require HCVP
participants to notify PHAs of the birth, adoption, or court-ordered custody of
71. Id. The “Brooke Amendment” to the housing program originally capped the tenant’s share of
rent at twenty-five percent of household income. See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-152, § 213(a), 83 Stat. 379, 389 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)).
72. 24 C.F.R. § 982.516(f) (2020).
73. Id. § 960.259(c)(1).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(4).
75. 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.257(a)(1), 982.516(a)(1).
76. Id. §§ 960.257(b)(1), 982.516(c)(2).
77. Id. §§ 960.257(d), 982.516(d).
78. LAWRENCE-DOUGLAS CNTY. HOUS. AUTH., supra note 67, at 79.
79. The Housing Authority of Baltimore City requires tenants to report income changes in
writing within ten working days. HOUS. AUTH. OF BALT. CITY, PUBLIC HOUSING ADMISSIONS &
CONTINUED OCCUPANCY POLICIES 14-9 (2019), https://www.habc.org/media/2449/the-fy-2021public-housing-acop_r2.pdf [https://perma.cc/J55G-PQ4Z]. The Topeka Housing Authority is more
lenient, allowing subsidized tenants to report changes in income in writing within thirty days of the
change. Tenant Declaration, TOPEKA HOUS. AUTH. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.tha.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/Income-Packet-Change-Booklet-112018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R2MGM4ZY].
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minor children and obtain approval before adding other people to the
household. 80 For similar reasons, HCVP tenants must “promptly notify” the
PHA if a family member no longer lives in the unit. 81 Federal regulations also
require PHAs to create policies for the reporting of household composition
changes by public housing tenants 82 and require public housing tenants to
provide the requested information related to household composition. 83
The regulations are silent, however, as to what documentation the PHAs
should require to prove a change in household composition. Some, like the
Housing Authority of Norwalk referenced in the Introduction, 84 require thirdparty verification that a former household member has a new residence before
officially removing them from the household records. 85 As another example, the
Topeka Housing Authority requires that a head of household provide a copy of
the former household member’s new lease, a copy of a utility bill showing their
new address, or a statement from the former household member’s new landlord
before it will remove the former household member from the household’s
official records. 86
It might be easy for subsidized tenants to comply with this requirement if
they maintain a good relationship with the former household member and that
person is able to produce documentation of their new residence. If the former
household member will not cooperate with requests for information, however,
there is little the tenant can do to obtain third-party verification of the former
household member’s new address. Housing providers generally refuse to release
their tenants’ personal information without the tenants’ consent or a court
order. 87 The requirement for third-party verification punishes tenants who no
longer have a good relationship with a former household member, whether due
80. 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(h)(2).
81. Id. § 982.551(h)(3).
82. Id. § 960.257(b)(2).
83. Id. § 960.259(a)(2).
84. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
85. Hous. Auth. of Norwalk v. Harris, No. SPNO 9009-10295, 1991 WL 270285, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 1991), rev’d sub nom. Hous. Auth. of Norwalk v. Harris, 611 A.2d 934 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1992), aff’d, 625 A.2d 816 (Conn. 1993).
86. TOPEKA HOUS. AUTH., CHANGE IN INCOME OR FAMILY MEMBERS (2018), https://www
.tha.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Income-Packet-Change-Booklet-112018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R2MG-M4ZY].
87. Such prohibitions might be codified in a state’s residential landlord-tenant act. See, e.g., VA.
CODE ANN. § 55.1-1209(A) (LEXIS through the 2020 Special Sess. I of the Gen. Assemb.) (requiring
that without the tenant’s prior written consent, a subpoena, or some other lawful basis, “[n]o landlord
or managing agent shall release information about a tenant or prospective tenant in the possession of
the landlord or managing agent to a third party”). Additionally, landlord policies related to
industry best practices might prohibit disclosure. See, e.g., Code of Ethics and Standards of Professionalism,
art. 1-5, NAT’L ASS’N RESIDENTIAL PROP. MANAGERS, https://www.narpm.org/code-of-ethics/
[https://perma.cc/Z3UH-FCYK] (“The Property Manager shall not reveal confidential information of
Clients, Tenants or others . . . [and] shall take all reasonable precautions to protect confidential
information.”).
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to familial strife or more serious circumstances involving domestic violence or
sexual violence.
Additionally, the third-party verification requirements can cause problems
if the former household member lacks stable housing. Many low-income people
who are evicted by landlords or move out of the family home end up bouncing
around between emergency shelters, cheap hotels, the homes of other family or
friends, or squatting in vacant units, sometimes staying only a night at a
particular place; other times, they may remain there for weeks or months before
having to find somewhere else to stay. 88 These individuals who are squatting,
couch surfing, or moving between emergency shelters cannot provide proof of
new permanent residence because they simply do not have a permanent
residence. In that instance, the subsidized tenant might be unable to update
their household composition if the PHA insists on waiting to remove the former
household member from the public housing lease or HCVP records until there
is third-party verification.
D.

Harms Caused by PHA Delays in Issuing a Decision

In addition to a lack of clarity as to how tenants should prove household
composition changes, neither the HCVP nor the public housing regulations
impose a deadline by which PHAs must approve household composition
changes. The regulations governing both programs merely state that PHAs
must conduct an interim reexamination “within a reasonable time after the
family request.” 89 The regulations do not specify what amount of time is
reasonable. Thus, it is up to PHAs to determine the speed with which they
respond to these requests. Some PHAs make determinations promptly, while
others take months to process requests. 90
PHA response time to requests to add or remove household members from
official records can effectuate tenants’ exercise of family privacy and family
autonomy rights (by helping create the household that tenants desire) or
interfere with those fundamental rights (by preventing the household that
88. See generally DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 16 (following eight families in the poorest
neighborhoods of Milwaukee as they struggle with eviction).
89. 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.257(b)(2), 982.516(c)(2) (2020).
90. For example, in a case involving the Housing Authority of Baltimore City, the PHA took
almost four months to issue a decision on a request to remove one household member and add
another. See Matthews v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City, 88 A.3d 852, 854 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2014). Similarly, the Housing Authority of the City of Annapolis repeatedly took more than four
months to process income recertification requests following reports of income reductions. See
Danielle Ohl, Talia Buford & Beena Raghavendran, An Annapolis Woman Was Sued Over Rent She Didn’t
Owe. It Took Seven Court Dates To Prove She Was Right, CAP. GAZETTE (Aug. 25, 2020),
https://www.capitalgazette.com/news/ac-cn-annapolis-housing-authority-rent-longform-2020082532vp7wne4ra4beqbbi2kmfjb3i-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/42Q7-ZHAA]. Based off author’s
experience, advocates report lengthy delays around the country, sometimes even longer than four
months.
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tenants desire). The harms that tenants experience when PHAs fail to respond
in a timely way to such requests are immediate and significant. PHA failure to
approve the addition of a family member disrupts family life. If the family
member waiting to be added is the tenant’s spouse or partner, the tenant is
deprived of their companionship and support if they wait for PHA approval to
have them move in. Moreover, the spouse or partner is unable to help with
childcare and participate in the daily life of the family. If the family member
waiting to be added is the tenant’s adult child, grandchild, or other family
member with no other place to stay, the tenant must bear the strain of seeing
their loved one unstably housed. This is particularly true during times of
economic stress such as the Great Recession and COVID-19 pandemic, when
some people were forced to move back to live with their parents or grandparents
because of job loss. 91 In sum, while waiting for PHA approval, a person cannot
be integrated into the life of the family in the same way as if they lived in the
unit.
On the other hand, the tenant could always choose to have the family
member move in before the PHA grants approval. However, the consequences
of having an unauthorized occupant could be disastrous for the family. Federal
regulations allow PHAs to terminate HCVP assistance to a family if they
violate their family obligations under the program. 92 One significant obligation
is to ensure that only allowed household members live in the subsidized unit. 93
HCVP participants who allow unauthorized occupants risk termination from
the voucher program. 94 Similarly, public housing tenants who allow
unauthorized occupants risk eviction for failure to cooperate with PHA
requirements related to family composition. 95 The tenants can even face
criminal prosecution for larceny and filing a false instrument. 96
PHA delays in removing a former household member from the official
records can be equally harmful. Until the PHA removes that person, their

91. See generally ZHENCHAO QIAN, U.S. 2010 PROJECT, DURING THE GREAT RECESSION,
MORE YOUNG ADULTS LIVE WITH PARENTS (2012), https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity/
Data/Report/report08012012.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MU7-X7DH] (describing how the Great
Recession was a large factor in young people living with their parents); Richard Fry, Jeffrey S. Passel
& D’vera Cohn, A Majority of Young Adults in the U.S. Live with Their Parents for the First Time
Since the Great Depression, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2020/09/04/a-majority-of-young-adults-in-the-u-s-live-with-their-parents-for-the-first-time-since-the
-great-depression/ [https://perma.cc/3SHW-8GTG] (noting that the coronavirus outbreak has pushed
millions of Americans, especially young adults, to move in with family members).
92. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i) (2020).
93. Id. § 982.551(h)(2).
94. Id. § 982.552(c)(1)(i); see, e.g., Basco v. Machin, 514 F.3d 1177, 1179 (11th Cir. 2008), overruled
on unrelated grounds by Yarbrough v. Decatur Hous. Auth., 931 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2019).
95. 24 C.F.R. § 960.259(a)(2) (2020).
96. See McGregor Smyth, Bridging the Gap: A Practical Guide to Civil-Defender Collaboration, 37
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY & POL’Y 56, 56 (2003).
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income is still counted as part of household income, which can set the
household’s rent higher than it should be. By overpaying rent, the tenant has
less money available to meet other household needs. Worse, if the tenant is
unable to pay the inflated amount, they are at risk for eviction due to failure to
pay rent. Any amount of money the tenant overpays each month until the PHA
corrects its records might seem small to the PHA but could be consequential
for a household dependent on means-tested benefits or low-wage work.
PHA delays in removing former household members from official records
and third-party verification requirements also put survivors of domestic
violence at risk of future abuse. Scholars and advocates have long noted that
domestic violence is a leading cause of homelessness among women and that
access to affordable housing is critical in helping women leave abusive
relationships. 97 The third-party verification requirement is especially dangerous
for survivors of domestic violence, who risk being newly victimized if they are
forced to interact with a former, abusive household member to obtain records
relating to their new housing. 98 Making a tenant’s housing stability dependent
on the cooperation of a former abusive household member gives that abuser
ongoing control over the survivor.
Additionally, PHA failure to remove a former household member from
the official records in a timely way puts the tenant at risk for eviction under the
one-strike eviction policy if that former household member is charged with

97. See generally U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS SURVEY: A STATUS
REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S CITIES (2013), https://mazon.org/assets/
Uploads/Hunger-and-Homelessness-Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3UB-P392] (identifying lack of
affordable housing and domestic violence as two of the main causes of homelessness among families
with children); Margaret E. Johnson, A Home with Dignity: Domestic Violence and Property Rights, 2014
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2014) (arguing for the creation of a comprehensive theory that expands existing
laws to promote dignity, end domestic violence, and ensure greater home access); Gretchen P. Mullins,
The Battered Woman and Homelessness, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 237, 244–54 (1994) (discussing the government’s
role in preventing battered women from becoming homeless when escaping their abusive partners);
Chiquita Rollins, Nancy E. Glass, Nancy A. Perrin, Kris A. Billhardt, Amber Clough, Jamie Barnes,
Ginger C. Hanson & Tina L. Bloom, Housing Instability Is as Strong a Predictor of Poor Health Outcomes
as Level of Danger in an Abusive Relationship: Findings from the SHARE Study, 27 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 623, 623–24 (2012) (finding that the greater the number of housing instability risk factors,
the more likely abused women reported symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder,
depression, and reduced quality of life, even when controlling for the amount of danger in the abusive
relationship); Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: A Major Cause of Homelessness, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
421, 429 (1991) (arguing that legal service programs should allocate more resources to cases that prevent
domestic violence in order to reduce the number of situations that deteriorate into evictions and
homelessness).
98. Prior scholarship has noted the absurdity of requiring a survivor to gain the cooperation of
their abuser in order to access public benefits, describing the plight of an applicant for emergency
shelter who left their apartment due to sexual harassment by her landlord. Susan D. Bennett, “No Relief
but Upon the Terms of Coming into the House”—Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements, and Homelessness
in an Urban Shelter System, 104 YALE L.J. 2157, 2170 (1995). The intake worker at the shelter insisted
she provide a written statement from the landlord corroborating her claims. Id.
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criminal activity. 99 The one-strike eviction policy allows PHAs to evict
innocent tenants if a household member, guest, or “other person under the
tenant’s control” engages in drug-related criminal activity on or off the public
housing property. 100 Tenants who themselves do not engage in criminal activity
can face eviction because of the criminal activity of other people—even if the
tenants did not know about or endorse the criminal activity. 101 Indeed, this is
precisely what happened to Ms. Harris. She herself was never accused of
engaging in criminal activity; rather, the daughter she had previously requested
be removed from her lease was arrested and charged. 102 The risk of eviction to
households of color whose family members are subject to overpolicing is
especially great. 103
Prior scholarship shows how the one-strike eviction policy imposes a strict
liability standard on subsidized tenants, contrary to the framework courts have
developed for justifying strict liability policies in other contexts. 104 Despite this
inconsistency, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the one-strike eviction
policy. 105 The effects of this policy on subsidized tenants are dire. Unreasonable
PHA delays in responding to requests to remove household members increase
the possibility of eviction, in addition to interfering with tenants’ family
autonomy.
The harms that low-income families experience following eviction are long
lasting. The Milwaukee Area Renters Study showed that of the tenants who
appeared at their eviction hearings and were subsequently evicted, only one out
of six had a place lined up to stay. 106 Public housing tenants or HCVP
participants who lose their subsidies through eviction or termination are at high
risk for homelessness because their low incomes make it difficult for them to
afford housing on the private market. 107 Further, many landlords still
discriminate against applicants with children, despite the FHA outlawing
discrimination based on familial status. 108 Finding a safe, stable place to stay can
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6).
100. Id.; 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.4(f)(12)(i)(A)(2), (f)(12)(ii)(A)(2) (2020).
101. Regina Austin, “Step on a Crack, Break Your Mother’s Back”: Poor Moms, Myths of Authority, and
Drug-Related Evictions from Public Housing, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 273, 275–76 (2002).
102. Hous. Auth. of Norwalk v. Harris, No. SPNO 9009-10295, 1991 WL 270285, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 1991), rev’d sub nom. Hous. Auth. of City of Norwalk v. Harris, 611 A.2d 934
(Conn. App. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 625 A.2d 816 (Conn. 1993).
103. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
104. See generally Ewert, supra note 51 (applying the four-pronged test used to critique public
welfare offenses to show that there is insufficient justification for imposing strict liability on innocent
tenants in public housing).
105. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002).
106. DESMOND, EVICTED supra note 16, at 97.
107. Ewert, supra note 51, at 86.
108. Discriminatory conduct against applicants with children includes telling applicants units are
unavailable, refusing to rent to families with children, advertising that children are not allowed, or
imposing strict occupancy limits. See DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 16, at 229; see also White v. U.S.
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be virtually impossible following eviction. Equally disruptive, eviction
jeopardizes employment. Attending hearings and searching for new housing
causes some tenants to be late for shifts or miss work, and the stress of eviction
can lead to poor job performance, resulting in termination. 109 Moving
unexpectedly can also lead to missing mail, including notices from government
agencies with information necessary for recertifying public benefits. On top of
the significant material hardship that evictions inflict on vulnerable tenants,
evictions can also lead to significant psychological strain, including depression
or even suicide. 110
Unreasonable PHA delays in approving household composition changes
create a host of problems. In particular, PHA control over the ability of
subsidized housing tenants—who are disproportionately Black women—to
determine household composition implicates fundamental rights related to
parenting and intimate partner relationships. As will be discussed further in
Part III, it is critical that PHAs follow procedural due process when responding
to requests to add or remove household members given this serious adverse
impact on constitutionally protected rights.
II. HISTORIC REGULATION OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES AND
HOUSEHOLDS OF COLOR DESPITE DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS
Throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the U.S.
Supreme Court established family privacy, parenting, and the ability to form
family relationships free from unnecessary government intrusion as
fundamental rights. However, people of color have not historically enjoyed the
benefits of these fundamental rights. Indeed, from this country’s inception until
the present day, families of color in general—and Black families in particular—
have faced significant intrusion into family autonomy and decision-making.

Dep’t of Hous. & Dev., 475 F.3d 898, 907 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that an owner’s statements
indicating they did not want to rent to families with children violated the FHA); United States v.
Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1179–80 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a one-person-per-bedroom rule had a
disparate impact on families with children and was impermissible); S. Cal. Hous. Rts. Ctr. v. Krug,
564 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that statements discouraging potential renters
with children from applying violated the FHA); Title VIII Conciliation Agreement at 6, Fair Hous.
Ctr. of Cent. Ind. v. Pierce Educ. Props., L.P., No. 05-20-7919-8 (HUD Aug. 18, 2020) (requiring as
part of a settlement that the respondent revise their policies regarding children); Complaint and Jury
Demand at 2, Maya Moss v. Asset Campus Hous., Inc., No. 18-cv-00487 (W.D. Ky. July 24, 2018)
(asserting that a one-bedroom-per-person policy discriminates against families); Lauren Brasil, Legal
Aid of NC Settlement Involving Familial Status Discrimination and Online Housing Advertisements,
FAIR HOUS. PROJECT (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.fairhousingnc.org/newsletter/legal-aid-of-northcarolina-settlement-involving-familial-status-discrimination-and-online-housing-advertisements/
[https://perma.cc/R82j-GT8U] (noting that language on a property’s website indicating that it was
only available to those above the age of twenty-one “violate[d] the Fair Housing Act”).
109. DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 16, at 227.
110. Id. at 296–98.
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Family Formation and Decision-Making as Fundamental Rights
1. Cases Related to Childrearing

The Court’s cases involving parenting and family decision-making started
in the early twentieth century. When reviewing a state law that restricted
foreign language education, the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska 111
interpreted the idea of “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause to include a wide range of activities relating to everyday life and family
relationships. 112 In holding the Nebraska law unconstitutional, the Court said
that liberty does not simply mean “freedom from bodily restraint” but also
includes the right of the individual “to marry, establish a home and bring up
children.” 113
Two years later in 1925, the Court similarly found unconstitutional an
Oregon law that mandated compulsory public school education, as opposed to
allowing private school education. In its decision in Pierce v. Society of the Sister
of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 114 the Court said, “The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.” 115 With these cases, the Court articulated the protected right of
parents to determine how to best raise their children and meet their needs.
In the early 1970s, the Court again expressed the idea of parental rights in
Stanley v. Illinois. 116 There, the Court addressed an Illinois law that made the
children of an unwed father wards of the state when the children’s mother died,
regardless of the father’s fitness to parent. 117 Yet again, the Court emphasized
the constitutional importance of the family, explaining, “The rights to conceive
and to raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’ ‘basic civil rights of
man,’ and ‘[r]ights far more precious . . . than property rights’” and that the
“integrity of the family unit” has found protection in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment. 118 The Court further noted that these
protections did not apply only to relationships formalized by a marriage

111. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
112. Id. at 399.
113. Id.
114. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
115. Id. at 535.
116. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
117. Id. at 646–47.
118. Id. at 651 (citations omitted) (first quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); then
quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); and then quoting May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
528, 533 (1953)).
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ceremony. 119 The ability to form relationships with family members—whether
through marriage or not—was a constitutionally protected right.
A few years later, in 1977, the Court considered what constituted a family.
In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 120 in which the
Court considered the due process rights of foster parents, the Court noted in
dicta that a blood relation was not required to make a family and that “the
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association” are
what make family life important. 121 That same year, the Court in Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 122 considered whether a local ordinance impermissibly
discriminated against families living in residential units. In that case, the city
cited a grandmother for allowing her son and his son (her grandchild) and
another grandchild (not born to her son) to live with her. 123
The Court in Moore wrote that “when the government intrudes on choices
concerning family living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the
importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they
are served by the challenged regulation.” 124 The Court rejected the rational basis
review used in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 125 which involved an ordinance
impacting households of unrelated individuals. 126 Instead, the Court said,
“When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family . . . the usual
judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate.” 127 The Court stated that
“freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” 128
The Court went on to discuss the importance of extended family in
American life, saying,
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting
the members of the nuclear family[.] The tradition of uncles, aunts,
cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with
parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving
of constitutional recognition. Over the years millions of our citizens have
grown up in just such an environment, and most, surely, have profited
from it. Even if conditions of modern society have brought about a decline in
119. The Court said, “Nor has the law refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized
by a marriage ceremony.” Id.
120. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
121. Id. at 844.
122. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
123. Id. at 496.
124. Id. at 499.
125. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
126. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 498.
127. Id. at 499.
128. Id. (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974)).
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extended family households, they have not erased the accumulated wisdom of
civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout our history, that
supports a larger conception of the family[.] Out of choice, necessity, or a sense
of family responsibility, it has been common for close relatives to draw together
and participate in the duties and the satisfactions of a common home. 129
In finding the city’s ordinance unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
expanded its understanding of what constituted a protected family to more than
just a married couple or parent and child. Later, though, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the special rights of parents, describing parenting as “perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” 130
2. Cases Related to Marriage and Sexuality
In addition to examining the right to parenting, the Court has also
considered the right to marriage. In 1967, in Loving v. Virginia, 131 the Court
found a Virginia statute prohibiting interracial marriage to be
unconstitutional. 132 The Court relied on an earlier decision striking down
sterilization of certain people based on criminal history, explaining, “The
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the
‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.” 133
The Court recognized the importance of people being able to choose their
spouses free from government intrusion based on race.
The Court affirmed the constitutionally protected right to marry in 1987,
even for people whose other liberties were severely curtailed. In Turner v.
Safley, 134 the Court held that while prisons could impose restrictions that were
reasonably related to penological interests, inmates still had a constitutionally
protected right to marry. 135 The Court described the important attributes of
marriage, including the public expression of commitment and support, the
exercise of religious faith, a hope for future intimacy, and qualification for
property rights and public benefits. 136 The Court found these to be significant
to inmates, despite other liberties having been taken away.
The Court also determined freedom and privacy related to sexual activity
and contraception to be constitutionally protected. In 1965, in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 137 the Court considered the “zone of privacy” in marriage and how
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 504–05 (emphasis added).
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 12.
Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
Id. at 99.
Id. at 95–96.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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it related to a state law that criminalized the use of birth control, including by
married people. 138 The Court found the law unconstitutional because it
interfered with privacy and decision-making in marriage. 139
Seven years later, the Court extended the right to access birth control to
unmarried people, as well as married people, 140 and the following year, in Roe v.
Wade, 141 the Court reaffirmed the right to privacy in marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing. 142 The Court then
interpreted privacy rights to include the right to abortion. 143 In his concurrence,
Justice Stewart discussed how Supreme Court decisions “make clear that
freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” 144
In 2003, the Court continued its development of privacy and family
autonomy as a fundamental right by turning its attention to same-sex couples.
In Lawrence v. Texas, 145 the Court struck down a state law criminalizing samesex sodomy. 146 Citing its earlier decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 147 in which the Court found a requirement that a woman
obtain her husband’s consent before an abortion to be unconstitutional, the
Court reiterated that “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education” are
constitutionally protected. 148 It then quoted Casey’s language about the
importance of dignity and autonomy, saying
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 149
The Court went on to explain the limits that this liberty imposes on government
action, saying, “Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government

138. Id. at 485.
139. See id. at 484–86 (“[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create
zones of privacy.” (citation omitted)).
140. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972).
141. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
142. Id. at 152–53.
143. Id. at 153.
144. Id. at 169 (Potter, J., concurring).
145. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
146. Id. at 578–79.
147. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
148. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
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intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is
not omnipresent in the home.” 150
Over the past century, the Supreme Court has developed a robust case law
establishing a clear vision of the fundamental right to privacy and autonomy in
people’s personal and home lives, whether with intimate partners, children, or
other family members. That liberty applies to people in same-sex relationships
and different-sex relationships, to parents and other people providing care for
children, and those living both inside and outside prison walls.
Those fundamental rights exist—and are constitutionally protected—even
if the person wishing to exercise those rights is not politically powerful or
socially popular. In Obergefell v. Hodges, 151 the Supreme Court held that laws
restricting same-sex marriage were unconstitutional. 152 The Court explained
that the issue was one appropriate not only for legislative action but also judicial
consideration, asserting that “[a]n individual can invoke a right to constitutional
protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and
even if the legislature refuses to act.” 153
Courts apply strict scrutiny when considering the constitutionality of
government action that infringes on fundamental rights. 154 This includes both
enumerated rights, such as the freedom of religion, and nonenumerated rights,
such as the right to privacy. 155 One scholar described the fundamental right to
privacy as having a “decisional” aspect related to intimacy decisions (the
relationships one chooses) and a “spatial” aspect related to home decisions (how
one uses or what happens in one’s home space). 156 Unreasonable PHA delays in
approving household composition directly conflict with both the decisional and
spatial aspects of the fundamental right to privacy because the delays make it
difficult for tenants to form and change family units, build marriages, and
engage in intimate acts with partners. Thus, the PHA practices should be
subject to strict scrutiny.

150. Id. at 562.
151. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
152. Id. at 2608.
153. Id. at 2605.
154. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved,
the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling state
interest,’ and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake.” (citations omitted) (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969))); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“Where fundamental claims . . . are at stake
. . . we must searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote . . . .”); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (“In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.”).
155. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155–56; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
156. G. Sidney Buchanan, A Very Rational Court, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1509, 1586–87 (1993).
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The persistence of this interference is unfortunately not surprising. As
discussed above, tenants in subsidized rental housing are exclusively lowincome and disproportionately women of color, a group historically and
currently underrepresented in positions of political power. 157 Despite the clear
precedent that the ability to marry, engage in consensual sexual acts with
partners, care for children according to parents’ best judgment, and create the
family and home life that people desire are constitutionally protected
fundamental rights, not all Americans have been able to exercise these rights.
As the next section describes, Black Americans, and especially Black women of
low income, have often been subject to legal restraints and governmental
intrusion into their family life.
B.

Restraints on the Ability of Enslaved People and Their Descendants To Marry
and Exercise Reproductive Autonomy

The regulation of Black families by the government permeates American
history. Indeed, the economic system that built the United States was premised
on the idea that Black people were less than human and lacking in meaningful
rights. 158 In turn, this perspective justified the buying and selling of enslaved
people with no regard for familial relationships. 159
Early colonies imposed significant restraints on marriage based on race.
Some colonies outlawed mixed-race marriages. 160 Other marriage restraints
during colonial times had consequences both for enslaved people themselves
and their partners. Entering into mixed-race marriages during colonial times
could change people’s legal status. 161 For example, in the colony of Maryland,
White people who married Black or mixed-race people were forced into
servitude, and free Black or mixed-race people who married White people
became enslaved. 162 Some laws even prohibited enslaved people from marrying
at all. 163
157. For a detailed analysis of the underrepresentation of Black women in state and federal office,
see ANDRE M. PERRY, ANALYSIS OF BLACK WOMEN’S ELECTORAL STRENGTH IN AN ERA OF
FRACTURED POLITICS (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2018.09.10
_metro_black-women-office_Perry_Final-version-sep10.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CGV-96MB].
158. See Jeremy Hobson, Without Slavery, Would the U.S. Be the Leading Economic Power?, NHPR,
https://www.nhpr.org/post/without-slavery-would-us-be-leading-economic-power#stream/0 [https://
perma.cc/MU7V-HHLQ].
159. The U.S. Constitution codified the idea that enslaved people were not fully human, counting
them as three-fifths of a person for the purposes of representation and the apportionment of taxes.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
160. MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 98 (rev. ed. 1996).
161. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 98.
162. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 408 (1857), superseded, (1868); see also ABRAMOVITZ,
supra note 160, at 98; Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATL. MONTHLY, June 2014, at 54,
63.
163. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 83.
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Following colonialism, antebellum slavery continued its devastation of
Black families. Because they could not legally contract, enslaved people
generally could not marry without the enslavers’ consent (even then, the
marriages lacked the legal significance and rights afforded White marriages). 164
Similarly, enslaved parents had no parental rights to their children. 165 Enslavers
could sell off family members, and enslaved people had no recourse. 166
Estimates of the rate of family separation are staggering. Roughly one-sixth of
marriages of enslaved people ended in forced separation. 167 In fact, half of
interstate sales of enslaved people in the South separated nuclear families and
one quarter of those sales destroyed a first marriage. 168 “In a time when
telecommunications were primitive and blacks lacked freedom of
movement, the parting of black families was a kind of murder. Here we
find the roots of American wealth and democracy—in the for-profit
destruction of the most important asset available to any people, the
family.” 169
Regulation of families of color generally—and Black families in
particular—continued following emancipation. States adopted different
strategies for legalizing the marriages of formerly enslaved people,
sometimes even without their knowledge or by using coercive means to
enforce marriage. 170 “Black Codes” throughout the South mandated
involuntary “apprenticeships” for children in poor Black families and rapes
against Black women were not criminalized. 171 States enacted antimiscegenation laws targeting Black people, like the one in Virginia that
gave rise to the Loving case. 172 And in the West, states prohibited interracial
marriage between White people and people of Asian descent. 173 Despite
free people having the legal right to contract, postbellum governments still

164. Darlene C. Goring, The History of Slave Marriage in the United States, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
299, 307 (2006) (“Slave couples joined together in quasi-marital unions that were sanctioned by the
plantation owners.”).
165. See id. at 311; Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1297, 1329 (1998).
166. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 35 (2d. ed. 2017) [hereinafter ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY]; Goring,
supra note 164, at 311; Hasday, supra note 165, at 1329–30; Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts
Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1439
(1991) [hereinafter Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies].
167. Hasday, supra note 165, at 1330.
168. See Coates, supra note 162, at 63.
169. Id.
170. Goring, supra note 164, at 314–33; Hasday, supra note 165, at 1339; R.A. Lenhardt, Marriage
as Black Citizenship?, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1317, 1327–28 (2015).
171. Hasday, supra note 165, at 1339.
172. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4–7 (1967).
173. Lenhardt, supra note 170, at 1332.
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imposed limits on the ability of people of color to create legal family
attachments.
In addition to marriage restraints, control over Black women’s fertility
was prevalent during slavery and afterwards. Many enslaved women were
subjected to rape and forced “breeding.” 174 Enslaved women often had little
control over the choice to become pregnant and who would father their
children.
In the early to mid-twentieth century, governmental and private actors
intervened to limit the fertility of women of color. Black women in
particular were more likely to undergo forced sterilization. 175 But in 1942,
the U.S. Supreme Court found that an Oklahoma law allowing the forced
sterilization of people determined to be “habitual criminals” was
unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 176 In its opinion, the Court addressed the harm of
racially discriminatory sterilization, saying, “In evil or reckless hands it can
cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and
disappear.” 177 Despite this caution, however, control of the fertility and family
choice of low-income Black women continues. Indeed, such control over these
highly personal decisions is built into our country’s social safety net.
C.

Institutionalized Racism and Sexism as Barriers to Public Benefits for
Households of Color

Government regulation of economic activity to protect low-income
Americans is deeply rooted in race, class, and sex-based discrimination, which

174. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 98 (discussing sexual violence and forced “breeding” during
colonialism); ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 166, at 27–29 (discussing rape by
White men, forced “breeding” with enslaved men, and maternity prizes); Pamela D. Bridgewater, Ain’t
I a Slave: Slavery, Reproductive Abuse, and Reparations, 14 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 119–20 (2005)
(discussing rape and forced “breeding”); Goring, supra note 164, at 311; Camille A. Nelson, American
Husbandry: Legal Norms Impacting the Production of (Re)productivity, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 3–4,
14–15 (2007) (discussing rape, the practice of performing experimental reproductive surgeries on
enslaved women, and forced “breeding”); Carla M. Newman, Essay: Bartering from the Bench: A
Tennessee Judge Prevents Reproduction of Social Undesirables; Historic Analysis of Involuntary Sterilization of
African American Women, 10 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 53, 53–55 (2018) (discussing
rape and “maternity prizes” to promote fertility and control women).
175. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 166, at 89–98 (discussing the sterilization
of institutionalized Black women and those seeking abortion, as well as the practice that came to be
known as “Mississippi appendectomies,” in which teaching hospitals in the South performed
sterilizations on Black women without their knowledge or consent while under anesthesia for other
procedures); Nelson, supra note 174, at 38–39; Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies, supra
note 166, at 1442–43; Ariel S. Tazkargy, From Coercion to Coercion: Voluntary Sterilization Policies in the
United States, 32 L. & INEQ. 135, 150–52 (2014) (discussing the practice of “Mississippi
appendectomies”).
176. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 537–38 (1942).
177. Id. at 541.
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led to the idea of the deserving and undeserving poor. In colonial times, the
“poor laws” mostly reserved public assistance for White people and
distinguished between “deserving” women (widows, women who were sick or
disabled or whose husbands were sick or disabled, and mothers of young
children) and “undeserving” women (women who had been divorced,
abandoned, or were never married). 178 Deserving women received financial
assistance and supplies to enable them to continue living in their own homes or
a neighbor’s home (“indoor relief”); undeserving women were forced to work
outside their homes and often made to live in poorhouses (“outdoor relief”). 179
While the deserving beneficiaries could retain much of their decision-making
autonomy, the undeserving beneficiaries were subject to public control over
decisions as basic as where they lived and worked.
During the 1800s, economic pressures and an increasing contempt for poor
people reduced available publicly funded outdoor relief and many programs
explicitly excluded Black people. 180 Private charities developed to meet people’s
needs, but these charities also distinguished between the deserving and
undeserving poor. 181 Like prior public aid programs, many private charities
excluded Black women. 182 In response, Black middle- and upper-class
community members formed private charities to serve low-income Black
people. 183 The 1800s also saw a proliferation of mental institutions and
orphanages, which served children from poor families in addition to children
whose parents had died. 184 These institutions severely restricted the rights of
the institutionalized people’s family members—including parents—to maintain
contact with them. 185 The disruption to family relationships through
government control was significant.

178. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 84–85; Judith E. Koons, Motherhood, Marriage, and Morality:
The Pro-Marriage Moral Discourse of American Welfare Policy, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 29–31 (2004)
(explaining the difference between the deserving poor, who were viewed as “subjects of ‘misfortune,
sickness, and adversity,’” and the undeserving poor, who were viewed as “idle and vicious” (quoting
NANCY E. ROSE, WORKFARE OR FAIR WORK 20 (1995))); Nantiya Ruan, Corporate Masters & LowWage Servants: The Social Control of Workers in Poverty, 24 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 103,
110–11 (2017).
179. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 84–86.
180. See generally William P. Quigley, The Quicksands of the Poor Law: Poor Relief Legislation in a
Growing Nation, 1790-1820, 18 N. ILL. UNIV. L. REV. 1 (1997) (providing a summary of individual
states’ poor laws and restrictions from 1790 to 1820); see also ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 146–50.
181. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 150–55.
182. Id. at 154–55.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 155–71; Kay Schriner & Lisa A. Ochs, Creating the Disabled Citizen: How Massachusetts
Disenfranchised People Under Guardianship, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 511–13 (2001); Sidney D. Watson,
From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and Community Care: Lessons from Medicaid’s History, 26 GA. ST.
UNIV. L. REV. 937, 941 (2010).
185. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 165–66.
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The Mothers’ Pensions created during the “Progressive” era of the late
1800s and early 1900s incorporated much of the race- and sex-based
discrimination of prior programs. The Mothers’ Pensions became a way to
encourage “deserving” low-income women to stay home and care for their
children instead of entering the labor market. 186 States structured their
Mothers’ Pensions to serve almost exclusively White women, whether because
Black women and other women of color were explicitly excluded based on race
or because individual applicants were determined not to be deserving. 187 These
public benefits cemented castes of women based on race.
Contemporary public benefits programs, born from the New Deal,
continued that caste system. President Roosevelt depended on the support of
Southern Democrats to implement his New Deal agenda and provide relief
during the Depression. 188 To appease the lawmakers who embraced White
supremacy, many important New Deal programs deliberately excluded Black
people. 189 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 190 (“FLSA”), which established
a federal minimum wage, 191 did not cover industries like agriculture and
domestic work, which at the time were dominated by Black workers. 192
This same animus was infused into cash aid and workforce development
programs under the New Deal. Racism permeated the Social Security Act of
1935, 193 which established cash assistance programs for retired and unemployed
workers and other people who were poor. 194 Like FLSA, the Old Age Insurance
Program and Unemployment Insurance Program excluded government
employees and domestic and agricultural workers from coverage, denying access

186. Id. at 184–85; KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 18–19 (2011); Michele Estrin Gilman, The Return of the Welfare
Queen, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 258 (2014) [hereinafter Gilman, The Return of the
Welfare Queen]; Koons, supra note 178, at 33–34.
187. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 200–02; GUSTAFSON, supra note 186, at 19; ELISA MINOFF,
CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. POL’Y, THE RACIST ROOTS OF WORK REQUIREMENTS 12 (2020),
https://cssp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Racist-Roots-of-Work-Requirements-CSSP-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9S45-RMNB].
188. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 42, at 155; Michele E. Gilman, En-Gendering Economic Inequality, 32
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 51 (2016) [hereinafter Gilman, En-Gendering Economic Inequality]; Priscilla
A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the Policing of Black Women in
Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1540, 1559 (2012).
189. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 42, at 155–56; Gilman, En-Gendering Economic Inequality, supra note
188, at 51.
190. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
191. Id. § 13, 52 Stat. at 1067–68 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 213).
192. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 234; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 42, at 154; Gilman, EnGendering Economic Inequality, supra note 188, at 51.
193. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
194. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 215.
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to almost all Black women and men. 195 Indeed, in 1937, two years after the
program’s inception, less than ten percent of employed Black men and less than
five percent of employed Black women worked in jobs covered by Old Age
Insurance. 196 Similarly, the Works Progress Administration programs routinely
refused to place Black and Latinx workers in jobs because they were supposedly
used to lower living standards and so less in need of assistance. 197 These critical
programs were deliberately inaccessible to most Black workers.
The Social Security Act of 1935 also established Aid to Dependent
Children (“ADC”), later known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(“AFDC”), which provided cash aid to mothers without male breadwinners. 198
ADC continued the distinction between deserving and undeserving women
previously drawn by the Mothers’ Pensions. 199 However, due to programmatic
and economic changes, by the 1960s ADC recipients were disproportionately
Black and Latinx women. 200
The shift in the demographic composition of beneficiaries corresponded
with increasingly invasive controls by the government in means-tested wealth
transfer programs. 201 In the 1950s, many states adopted “substitute father” or
“man in the house” rules that disqualified a family from benefits if an ablebodied man was living there. 202 ADC workers conducted midnight raids to
check for the presence of men in assisted homes. 203 Today, some states require
mothers to establish paternity of their children and pursue child support to
continue receipt of welfare benefits. 204 Also, some means-tested benefits
programs collect biometric data through fingerprints and photographs, linking

195. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 287–89; Gilman, En-Gendering Economic Inequality, supra
note 188, at 51. In 1930, 62.6% of Black women were domestic workers, and 40.7% of employed Black
men worked in the agricultural sector. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 250.
196. In 1937, only 8% of Black men and 4.2% of Black women worked in jobs covered by the Social
Security Act. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 250.
197. Id. at 283.
198. Id. at 313; GUSTAFSON, supra note 186, at 19–20.
199. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 318–19; ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note
166, at 205–07; Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, supra note 186, at 258; Ocen, supra note 188,
at 1559.
200. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 320–21.
201. Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 317, 330–31 (2014) [hereinafter Bach, The Hyperregulatory State]; Ocen, supra note 188, at
1562; Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, supra note 186, at 258–62.
202. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 324; GUSTAFSON, supra note 186, at 21.
203. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 324–25; GUSTAFSON, supra note 186, at 21; Gilman, The
Return of the Welfare Queen, supra note 186, at 258.
204. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 325; ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 163,
at 228; Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 1399
(2012) [hereinafter Gilman, The Class Differential]; Ocen, supra note 188, at 1562–63.
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indigency to criminality. 205 On a regular basis, states pass laws to condition
receipt of means-tested benefits on passing a drug test. 206 Further, access to
public benefits has often been linked to regulation of fertility, whether through
sterilization or birth control campaigns. 207 Women applying for prenatal health
benefits are subjected to a barrage of invasive, often painful questions unrelated
to the benefits themselves. 208 In using language relating to slavery to describe
the way the government administers means-tested benefits, one scholar called
government the “overseer of family life” of vulnerable women. 209
The consequences of these programmatic structures are dire.
Discriminatory intrusion into the privacy of low-income individuals,
particularly low-income women of color, promotes stigma, engenders distrust
in our democracy, and perpetuates existing inequalities. 210 Scholars have noted
the way regulatory mechanisms for means-tested benefits pass information to
other programs controlling the lives of poor people. 211 One scholar described
this phenomenon as “regulatory intersectionality,” explaining how subsidized
housing providers and other benefits programs pass information to and from

205. Wendy A. Bach, Poor Support / Rich Support: (Re)viewing the American Social Welfare State, 20
FLA. TAX REV. 495, 537 (2017) [hereinafter Bach, Poor Support / Rich Support]; Gilman, The Class
Differential, supra note 204, at 1404; Ocen, supra note 188, at 1565.
206. GUSTAFSON, supra note 186, at 59–60; Bach, The Hyperregulatory State, supra note 201, at 357–
60; Ocen, supra note 188, at 1565.
207. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 166, at 209–11; Gilman, The Class
Differential, supra note 204, at 1399–1400.
208. See Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 124–
30 (2011) (listing the required disclosures of private information that women must share when seeking
prenatal coverage through Medicaid).
209. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 160, at 206.
210. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 166, at 294–99 (showing in the context of
procreative privacy that “[o]nce liberty is set up to protect only the interests of the most privileged, it
then excludes the equality claims of the dispossessed”); Kimberly D. Bailey, Watching Me: The War on
Crime, Privacy, and the State, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1539, 1556–57 (2014) (explaining that low-income
people of color affected by the war on crime “logically conclude that the state does not respect them
nor does it view their identities and viewpoints as equal to those of white and wealthier citizens”);
Gilman, The Class Differential, supra note 204, at 1441–43 (discussing how welfare surveillance and
negative interactions with public institutions stigmatize low-income individuals and lead to decreased
participation in the political process); Michele Estrin Gilman, Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism, 39 U.
BALT. L.F. 1, 7–9 (2008) [hereinafter Gilman, Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism] (describing the
psychological, material, and physical harms that poor women experience as a result of government
intrusion into their privacy).
211. See generally GUSTAFSON, supra note 186, at 54 (explaining how the information exchange
results in low-income citizens being arrested); Bach, Poor Support / Rich Support, supra note 205, at 531
(describing how regulatory functions result in individuals being targeted, stigmatized, and excluded);
Gilman, The Class Differential, supra note 204, at 1397–99 (“[I]nformation is electronically shared and
compared with numerous federal and state databases, as well as commercial databases, to verify
eligibility . . . .”); Ocen, supra note 188, at 1565 (“As a consequence of the deviant welfare queen
imagery that policymakers activate in discussions of the welfare system, sets of monitoring systems
have been embedded within subsidy eligibility determinations.”).
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law enforcement, child protective services, and other programs. 212 This
regulatory intersectionality takes away privacy and destabilizes families. 213
Notably, this invasive regulation is not present in wealth transfer programs that
serve middle- and upper-income households.
D.

Critiques of Hyperregulation in Means-Tested Benefits Programs

Many scholars have noted the disparities in regulation between meanstested public expenditures that give money and resources to low-income
households (including AFDC, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
benefits, and subsidized rental housing) and public expenditures that give
money and resources to predominantly middle- and upper-income households
(such as the mortgage interest tax deduction and other tax breaks, farm
subsidies, and in-state tuition at public colleges and universities). 214 One scholar
illustrated this disparity using a familiar hypothetical:
Imagine that tax returns demanded detail about substance use and
criminal records for everyone who lives in your home, and then the IRS
sent inspectors to high-income homes to verify occupancy. Imagine
further that, if it appeared that there was an unauthorized person, that
high-income taxpayers would lose the [home mortgage interest
deduction]. Imagine police sweeps and task forces targeting deduction
recipients. I would argue that all of this is nothing short of
unimaginable. 215

212. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State, supra note 201, at 322; Bach, Poor Support / Rich Support, supra
note 205, at 529–30.
213. For a detailed discussion of the intersectionality of the criminal law system, foster care system,
and services for low-income parents and the effects of that intersectionality on Black mothers, see
generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59
UCLA L. REV. 1474 (2012).
214. See generally KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 65–66 (2017)
[hereinafter BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS] (putting forward that poor women’s
families are treated much differently than their nonpoor counterparts); ROBERTS, KILLING THE
BLACK BODY, supra note 166, at 226 (“Middle-class Americans avoid these impositions because they
receive their benefits in the form of entitlements and tax breaks that are not subject to the discretion
of caseworkers, supervisors, or administrators. While poor single mothers must endure government
surveillance for their paltry benefits, ‘self-sufficient’ traditional families receive huge public subsidies
— Social Security, tax breaks, and government-backed mortgages, for example — without any loss of
privacy.”); Bach, The Hyperregulatory State, supra note 201, at 366 (concluding that punitive policies are
targeted disproportionately); Bach, Poor Support / Rich Support, supra note 205, at 539–43
(distinguishing the benefits available for those higher on the income scale compared to those available
for individuals at the bottom); Gilman, The Class Differential, supra note 204 (describing the differences
in privacy between low-income Americans and middle-class Americans that results from complex
interactions between class, race, and gender); Ocen, supra note 188 (arguing that the denial of
subsidized rental housing opportunities and the surveillance and regulation of Black female-headed
households in three California cities is functionally analogous to the repudiated racially restrictive
covenant).
215. Bach, Poor Support / Rich Support, supra note 205, at 534.
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Thus, “[a]s one moves from benefits for the poor towards benefits for the
rich, the administrative structures become less and less punitive and risky and
more and more like invisible entitlements.” 216 At the higher end of the income
spectrum, aid recipients experience the state as an enabling, helpful force and
have the resources needed to hire counsel to protect their rights when
government oversteps. 217 At the lower end of the spectrum, aid recipients with
fewer resources and more limited access to counsel experience the
“hyperregulatory state,” one whose “mechanisms are targeted by race, class,
gender, and place to exert punitive social control over poor, African-American
women, their families, and their communities.” 218
Scholars have discussed at length how constitutional law protections
granting privacy and liberty are applied for the wealthy but not the poor. 219 In
particular, some have critiqued the invasive programmatic requirements of
means-tested benefits through the lens of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, noting the Supreme Court’s tendency to uphold conditions affecting
low-income recipients of means-tested benefits while striking down conditions
on benefits that favor middle- and upper-income recipients. 220 One scholar
explained this problem, saying “Poverty Law in the United States subsists
within a constitutional framework that constructs a separate and unequal rule
of law for poor people. Across constitutional doctrines, poor people suffer
diminished protection, with their claims for liberty and equality formally

216. Id. at 498.
217. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State, supra note 201, at 318–19.
218. Id.
219. For a discussion of constitutional law protections granted to the wealthy but not the poor, see
generally BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS, supra note 214; ROBERTS, KILLING THE
BLACK BODY, supra note 166, at 294–312; Wendy A. Bach, Flourishing Rights, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1061,
1071 (2015); Bailey, supra note 210; Gilman, The Class Differential, supra note 204; Gilman, Welfare,
Privacy, and Feminism, supra note 210, at 9–10.
220. See generally BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS, supra note 214, at 65–100
(discussing the Court’s inconsistent interpretation of privacy rights that results in “poor mothers’
privacy rights seem[ing] to function differently than the privacy rights that wealthier mothers enjoy”);
Julie A. Nice, Making Conditions Constitutional by Attaching Them to Welfare: The Dangers of Selective
Contextual Ignorance of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 971, 972 (1995)
(criticizing the result that “seems nearly preordained for welfare recipients: when courts encounter
arguably unconstitutional conditions attached to welfare, they tend to uphold those conditions
(regardless of the strength of the constitutional guarantee at issue), although they would apply full
review to a non-welfare condition”); Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of
Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629 (2008) [hereinafter
Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever] (tracing how the Supreme Court has deconstitutionalized poverty law);
Jonathan Romberg, Is There a Doctrine in the House? Welfare Reform and the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1051 (1995) (discussing that the Supreme Court has offered no
explanation why governmental pressure on property rights requires more exacting review than similar
pressure on liberty rights).
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receiving the least judicial consideration and functionally being routinely
denied.” 221
This discriminatory constitutional framework is apparent in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Wyman v. James. 222 In 1971, the Court heard a case
challenging mandatory home visits for New York’s AFDC program. 223 Ms.
James, an AFDC recipient, consented to allowing the program access to records
to confirm her ongoing eligibility and agreed to meet with the caseworker
outside her home. 224 However, she objected on constitutional grounds to a
mandatory in-home visit. 225 In ruling against her, the Court stated many
reasons why it found the mandatory home visits to be reasonable. It claimed
that the visits were necessary to protect children and to ensure that public funds
were being used responsibly, 226 that they were not a burden to the recipients
because they received advance notice, 227 that Fourth Amendment protections
did not apply because a benefits eligibility determination was not a criminal
investigation, 228 and that the recipients had accepted the governmental
intrusion when they accepted the benefits. 229 The Court even compared
mandatory in-home visits to taxpayers being required to produce records during
a tax audit. 230
This reasoning mischaracterized the nature of the regulation. Admittedly,
in 1971 the Supreme Court was only partway into its development of family
privacy and autonomy as fundamental, constitutionally protected rights.
However, requiring the AFDC recipient to allow government workers into her
home was not at all like taxpayers producing records in an audit meeting.
Indeed, Ms. James demonstrated a willingness to produce all records reasonably
related to the eligibility determination; she just did not want unnecessary
intrusion into her physical space. 231 Given the protections afforded the home in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and American law’s view of the home as
“sacred” space, 232 Ms. James’s refusal to conduct the recertification
appointment in her home seems reasonable.
221. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever, supra note 220, at 629.
222. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
223. Id. at 310.
224. Id. at 313.
225. Id. at 314.
226. Id. at 318–19.
227. Id. at 320–21.
228. Id. at 321–23.
229. Id. at 324.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 313.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (noting that “private residences are
places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized
by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable”);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980) (“[A]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment]
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The dissents in Wyman v. James rightfully raised the issue of family privacy
and autonomy and saw the mandatory home visits for AFDC recipients as
constitutional violations. Justice Marshall attacked the idea that the home visits
were necessary to protect children, noting that child abuse did not occur solely
in poor households, yet the government had not instituted home visits for all
people. 233
Justice Douglas noted that the government’s invasive intrusions to
allegedly prevent fraud only extended to expenditures for low-income
families. 234 He said,
If the welfare recipient was not Barbara James but a prominent, affluent
cotton or wheat farmer receiving benefit payments for not growing crops,
would not the approach be different? Welfare in aid of dependent children,
like social security and unemployment benefits, has an aura of suspicion. There
doubtless are frauds in every sector of public welfare whether the
recipient be a Barbara James or someone who is prominent or
influential. 235
The dissenting Justices viewed the Court as applying a different
constitutional standard for family privacy to AFDC recipients than other
people. 236 The dissents reflect the concern for family privacy and autonomy
developed through Supreme Court case law during the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries. Unfortunately, the majority view in Wyman has not yet been
overturned and pervades policy discussion today regarding what protections
means-tested public benefits recipients—including subsidized housing
tenants—are due. 237
Family privacy matters. The Supreme Court developed a line of case law
protecting family privacy and autonomy because it saw the right to parent, pick

stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))); see also
Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth
Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 957 (1997) (“The most sacred of all areas protected by
the Fourth Amendment is the home.”); Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the
Sanctuary, and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 203 (1995) (“The rhetoric of the inviolability and
privacy of the home repeatedly employs images of sanctuary . . . This language of sanctuary signals that
the home is a refuge for persons and their intimate relationships against invasion and intrusion, either
by government or by others.”); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1215 (2004) (describing the home as “the primary defense” in American
privacy law).
233. See James, 400 U.S. at 340–42 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing the home visits as a
“severe intrusion upon privacy and family dignity”).
234. Id. at 332 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
235. Id. (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 347.
237. See, e.g., Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional Status and
the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 356, 357–58 (2010).

99 N.C. L. REV. 869 (2021)

904

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99-4

intimate partners, and establish home lives as integral to a well-ordered society.
Unfortunately, like the administration of many other means-tested benefits
programs, the procedure by which PHAs approve the addition or removal of
household members interferes with the family autonomy and privacy of lowincome women with harmful results. The requirements PHAs impose to add or
remove household members from official records make it difficult for subsidized
housing tenants to exercise their constitutionally protected right to parent,
partner, and form family units. Procedural due process protections are necessary
to protect these fundamental rights.
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Given the critical role housing plays in people’s lives and the harm that
low-income families experience when they lose their subsidized housing, it is
fitting that courts around the country have found that people have a protected
property interest in subsidized rental housing. 238 In Goldberg v. Kelly, 239 the
Supreme Court laid out due process protections required for certain public
benefits. 240 Other courts then extended those protections to subsidized
housing. 241 The Fourth Circuit held that “[t]he ‘privilege’ or the ‘right’ to
occupy publicly subsidized low-rent housing seems to us to be no less entitled
to due process protection than entitlement to welfare benefits which were the
subject of decision in Goldberg or the other rights and privileges referred to in
Goldberg.” 242 A federal district court similarly held that “[o]nce an applicant for
public housing is accepted and becomes a tenant, there can be no doubt that a
‘property interest’ is created, entitling the tenant to protections of the due
process clause.” 243 Even the U.S. Supreme Court found it “undoubtedly true”
that public housing residents have a protected property interest in their
subsidized housing. 244 This property interest supplements fundamental
constitutional rights relating to family privacy and autonomy. Unfortunately,
how PHAs implement due process in the context of adding and removing
household members substantially weakens the constitutional protections
proclaimed by the Court.

238. Ewert, supra note 51, at 63–65.
239. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
240. Id. at 255–57.
241. See Escalera v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 862–63 (2d Cir. 1970); Caulder v. Durham
Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1002–04 (4th Cir. 1970); see also Jaime Alison Lee, Poverty, Dignity, and
Public Housing, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 119 (2016).
242. Caulder, 433 F.2d at 1003.
243. Singleton v. Drew, 485 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (citing Caulder, F.2d at 998).
244. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 135 (2002).
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Procedural Due Process Requirements Under Goldberg

In Goldberg, the Supreme Court examined New York’s termination
procedures for recipients of AFDC and state cash aid benefits. 245 Specifically,
the Court considered “whether the Due Process Clause requires that the
recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing before the termination of
benefits.” 246 When the case was filed, the state did not require either notice or
a hearing before terminating cash aid. 247
The Court found New York’s pretermination procedures unconstitutional
and explicitly stated what due process required. 248 First, the public benefits
recipient was entitled to “timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a
proposed termination.” 249 The recipient needed to know why the agency was
planning to take adverse action. Second, the agency had to provide the recipient
“an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and
by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally.” 250 A written challenge
was not enough; the participants had to have the opportunity to present their
case in person and cross-examine witnesses used against them. Third, the
recipient must have the right to be represented by counsel at the hearing. 251
Although the agency was not required to provide representation to the
participants, it could not deny participants the right to retain and use their own
attorneys when presenting their case. 252 Finally, the Court held that the
decisionmaker had to be impartial and base their decision “solely on the legal
rules and evidence adduced at the hearing.” 253 Further, the decision had to state
both the reasoning behind the decision and the evidence on which it was
based. 254
In explaining why these due process protections were necessary, Justice
Brennan used soaring language to describe the critical role that public benefits
play in American society. He wrote,
From its founding the Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster the dignity
and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come to recognize
that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty.
This perception, against the background of our traditions, has
significantly influenced the development of the contemporary public
assistance system. Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence,
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 255–56.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 268–71.
Id. at 267–68.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 270–71.
Id.
Id. at 271.
Id.
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can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that
are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the
community. At the same time, welfare guards against the societal malaise
that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and
insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to “promote
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity.” 255
Justice Brennan understood that people’s inherent dignity necessitated a
government-sponsored social safety net, and that the safety net had to be
administered fairly in order to accomplish its goals. Indeed, Justice Brennan
went on to say, “The same governmental interests that counsel the provision of
welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted provision to those eligible to receive
it; pre-termination evidentiary hearings are indispensable to that end.” 256
The Court later narrowed the scope of its due process protections for
certain public benefits recipients, finding in Mathews v. Eldridge 257 that a
pretermination hearing was not necessary for recipients of Social Security
disability benefits. 258 The Court distinguished between means-tested benefits
programs like welfare, reserved for the most indigent, and disability programs,
where eligibility was not based on financial need. 259 In Mathews, the Court
concluded that “the disabled worker’s need is likely to be less than that of a
welfare recipient” 260 because they might have access to private resources or
could apply for other public benefits if they lost their disability benefits, while
the welfare recipients likely have access to fewer alternative resources. As such,
less rigorous due process protections were necessary for Social Security
disability benefits than for means-tested benefits programs.
Like welfare, public housing and the HCVP are means-tested benefits
reserved for people of very low income. Under the Goldberg and Mathews
analyses, they should have stricter due process requirements for adverse
government actions than non-means-tested benefits programs. Indeed, the
statutes and regulations governing these subsidized housing programs include
significant procedural due process protections. However, they are still
insufficient to fully protect participants’ dignity and autonomy.
B.

Procedural Due Process in Subsidized Rental Housing

Many regulatory protections for subsidized rental housing address the due
process issues raised in Goldberg. The PHA must provide written notice that
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 264–65 (emphasis added (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.)).
Id.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 349.
Id. at 340–41.
Id. at 342.
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explains the reasons for an adverse decision and the participant’s right to request
a hearing. 261 Prior to the hearing, the participant may conduct discovery by
reviewing the PHA records. 262 If the PHA does not make documents available
to the participant, it cannot use them at the hearing. 263 The participant may
have counsel present at the hearing. 264 The hearing officer must not be the
person who made the adverse decision or a subordinate of that person. 265 The
participant may present evidence at the hearing and may cross-examine the
PHA witnesses. 266 Finally, the hearing officer must issue a written decision
explaining the reason for the decision. 267 If the hearing officer issues a decision
upholding the adverse decision, the subsidized tenant may then pursue review
of the decision in state court. 268
Despite these protections, however, there are some serious due process
deficiencies in subsidized rental housing. These deficiencies are especially
problematic for people requesting to add or remove household members. First,
the federal regulations provide no mechanism for participants to access thirdparty records. Many PHAs require tenants to provide proof of a former
household member’s new residence through a lease, utility bill, landlord
certification, or some other verification before they will formally remove the
household member from the records and redetermine rent. 269 However, the
261. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k)(1)–(2) (applying due process protections to “any proposed adverse
public housing agency action,” not just actions to terminate participation); 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.4(k)(1)(i),
966.51(a)(1), 966.53(a), 982.555(c) (2020).
262. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k)(3); 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.56(b)(1), 982.555(e)(2)(i) (2020).
263. 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.56(b)(1), 982.555(e)(2)(i).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k)(4); 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.56(b)(2), 982.555(e)(3).
265. 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.53(e), 982.555(e)(4)(i).
266. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k)(5); 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.56(b)(4), 982.555(e)(5).
267. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k)(6); 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.57(a), 982.555(e)(6).
268. The mechanism for reviewing a PHA decision varies based on state law. In some jurisdictions,
it would be through a mandamus action; in others, it would be through judicial review. See, e.g.,
Montgomery v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City, 731 F. Supp. 439, 442 (D. Md. 2010).
269. For example, the Topeka Housing Authority requires tenants to provide a copy of the former
household member’s new lease, utility bill showing their new address, or a statement from their new
landlord in order to remove a former household member from the tenant’s official records. TOPEKA
HOUS. AUTH., CHANGE IN INCOME OR FAMILY MEMBERS 2 (2018), https://www.tha.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/Income-Packet-Change-Booklet-112018.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MJK-U5N5].
The Lawrence-Douglas County Housing Authority is less specific, requiring “documentation that [the
former household member] obtained replacement housing.” LAWRENCE-DOUGLAS CNTY. HOUS.
AUTH., COMBINED ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN AND ADMISSION & CONTINUED OCCUPANCY
POLICIES AND METHODS OF ADMINISTRATION FOR ALL LDCHA PROGRAMS 80 (2020),
https://storage.googleapis.com/wzukusers/user-31752601/documents/969aae83f0b34d599f5e30057de7
7d06/ADMIN-ACOP%20Master%20Copy%20Amended%2010-26-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DTC
-74SN]. The Housing Authority of Baltimore City requires the tenant complete a “certification of
removal” and provide “verification of removal,” such as the former household member’s new address.
HOUS. AUTH. OF BALT. CITY, PUBLIC HOUSING ADMISSIONS & CONTINUED OCCUPANCY
POLICIES 14-12 (2019), https://www.habc.org/media/2449/the-fy-2021-public-housing-acop_r2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UL3H-5Y8F].
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federal regulations provide no mechanism for issuing subpoenas. 270 The
participants have a right to review PHA records 271 and bring their own evidence
to hearings and cross-examine any witnesses the PHA calls. 272 They have no
right to review third-party records or compel the attendance of third parties at
PHA events. Thus, PHA policies requiring tenants to produce a former
household member’s new lease, a utility bill, or landlord certification of new
residence require them to produce evidence to which they are not legally
entitled and often have no way to access. It is inconsistent with procedural due
process protections that tenants be required to produce third-party verification
they cannot legally obtain.
Additionally, although subsidized housing rules give participants
significant administrative rights to challenge adverse PHA decisions, those
rights do not go into effect until the PHA actually issues a decision. When
PHAs fail to respond promptly to a request to add or remove a household
member, there is no decision—neither a favorable one to enforce nor an adverse
one to appeal. The participant is unable to utilize the due process protections
in place to compel the PHA to adjust their household composition records.
Instead, they must continue in limbo, perhaps paying too much in rent or being
at risk for eviction if the person who used to live in the household is arrested
for criminal activity, as demonstrated by Ms. Harris’s case in the Introduction.
These procedural due process deficiencies are extremely problematic
because they interfere with subsidized tenants’ fundamental right to form the
family units they want, as detailed in Part II. In striking down a law that
interfered with parental rights, the Supreme Court explained that due process
rights “were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from
the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize
praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre
ones.” 273 PHAs might say that requiring them to address these deficiencies
would create an administrative burden. However, given that family privacy and
autonomy are protected, fundamental rights guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution, it is critical that PHAs and HUD implement changes to their
practices and regulations to address these deficiencies. Indeed, other areas of
administrative law show reasonable solutions.
C.

Solution 1: Treating Lack of PHA Response as a Denial

Imposing time limits on PHAs to respond to requests to add or remove
household members would be a convenient solution for subsidized tenants.

270.
271.
272.
273.

Edgecomb v. Hous. Auth. of Town of Vernon, 824 F. Supp. 312, 316 (D. Conn. 1993).
24 C.F.R. §§ 966.56(b)(1), 982.555(e)(2)(i).
Id. §§ 966.56(b)(4), 982.555(e)(5).
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
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Indeed, other means-tested benefits programs include federally imposed time
limits for agency action. 274 Further, the HUD Multifamily Occupancy
Handbook, which lays out procedures for subsidized housing programs like
Project-Based Section 8 and Section 202 housing for the elderly, provides that
“[g]enerally, [interim recertifications based on family income and composition
changes] should not exceed 4 weeks.” 275 HUD expects private housing providers
receiving federal subsidies for low-income tenants to process household change
requests quickly. However, it is unlikely that Congress will soon amend the
authorizing statutes or that HUD will implement regulatory changes to impose
a time limit on PHAs administering public housing or HCVP programs, given
the many housing issues stemming from the pandemic that require immediate
attention. 276

274. Federal law requires that states process Medicaid applications and provide benefits to eligible
individuals “with reasonable promptness.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). The regulations implementing the
Medicaid program require states to process Medicaid applications within forty-five days, unless the
application requires a disability determination; in that case, the state must process the application
within ninety days. 42 C.F.R. § 435.911(a)(1)–(2) (2020). Similarly, the federal authorizing statute
requires that states process Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) applications and
start benefits for eligible households within thirty days from the date of application, unless they are
entitled to expedited service. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3); 7.C.F.R. § 273.2(g)(1) (2020).
275. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., HUD MULTIFAMILY OCCUPANCY HANDBOOK
CHAPTER 7: RECERTIFICATION, UNIT TRANSFERS, AND GROSS RENT CHANGES 7–24 (2013),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/43503C7HSGH.PDF [https://perma.cc/Y98R-ZEDL].
276. This author is not optimistic that there would be bipartisan support for a proposal to amend
the statutory subsidized housing scheme in favor of tenants. Further, even with Democratic control of
Congress and the White House, elected officials will likely focus their attention on the myriad of
challenges facing the country as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. Addressing the issue of household
change requests will likely be low priority for Congress. A regulatory fix might be more feasible. It is
already clear that under the Biden-Harris Administration, HUD will follow practices like those of the
Obama Administration, which worked to expand access to housing by reducing criminal record
screening in subsidized housing, expanding protections for transgender individuals in emergency
shelter, and clarifying the FHA mandate that cities and towns receiving federal funding examine their
policies to determine whether they contain barriers to fair housing. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB.
DEV. OFF. OF PUB. & INDIAN HOUS., HUD Notice PIH 2015-9, Guidance for Public Housing
Authorities (PHAs) and Owners of Federally-Assisted Housing on Excluding the Use of Arrest
Records in Housing Decisions (Nov. 2, 2015); Equal Access in Accordance with an Individual’s Gender
Identity in Community Planning and Development Programs, 81 Fed. Reg. 64,763 (Sept. 21, 2016)
(codified at 24 C.F.R. § 5.106); Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16,
2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R pt. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 903). Already, President Biden has issued
a memorandum to the HUD Secretary about the need to redress the federal government’s role in
perpetuating discriminatory housing practices. In it, he said,
It is the policy of my Administration that the Federal Government shall work with
communities to end housing discrimination, to provide redress to those who have experienced
housing discrimination, to eliminate racial bias and other forms of discrimination in all stages
of home-buying and renting, to lift barriers that restrict housing and neighborhood choice, to
promote diverse and inclusive communities, to ensure sufficient physically accessible housing,
and to secure equal access to housing opportunity for all.
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An alternative to imposing time limits that would allow participants to
exercise administrative and judicial review rights would be to treat PHA failure
to respond to a request within a reasonable amount of time as a constructive
denial. The “denial” would then trigger review rights under existing federal and
state law. This approach already exists in federal statutory law. The Federal
Tort Claims Act 277 specifically states that “[t]he failure of an agency to make
final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option
of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim,” after
which the complainant can file a case in court without going through the
administrative process. 278 However, Congress and HUD are unlikely to
implement this legislative or regulatory fix anytime soon, given current
priorities and the political climate. 279
A judicial remedy, however, is possible if courts apply the doctrine of
constructive denial.
1. Constructive Denials in Fair Housing Law
Trial and appellate courts already treat unreasonable delays as denials in
the fair housing context. The FHA requires that housing providers make
reasonable accommodations to policies or procedures or allow reasonable
modifications to units to allow people with disabilities to use the housing. 280
Although the statute does not identify what is a reasonable time for a decision,
courts have consistently found that unreasonable delays by housing providers
constitute a denial.
President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Memorandum on Redressing Our Nation’s and the Federal Government’s
History of Discriminatory Housing Practices and Policies, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 26, 2021), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/26/memorandum-on-redressingour-nations-and-the-federal-governments-history-of-discriminatory-housing-practices-and-policies/
[https://perma.cc/F83G-2XEM]. Shortly thereafter, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing
& Equal Opportunity at HUD issued a memorandum directing the enforcement of the FHA to
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. JEANINE M. WORDEN,
MEMORANDUM ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13988 ON THE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 1 (2021), https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PA/documents/HUD
_Memo_EO13988.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XMK-CZTJ]. This approach to fair housing protections is
vastly different from that of the Trump Administration, which rescinded the Affirmatively Furthering
Fair Housing Rule and began steps to rescind the Equal Access Rule. See Preserving Community and
Neighborhood Choice, 85 Fed. Reg. 47,899 (Aug. 7, 2020) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5, 91, 92,
570, 574, 576, 903); Making Admission or Placement Determinations Based on Sex in Facilities Under
Community Planning and Development Housing Programs, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,811 (Proposed July 24,
2020) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5, 576). It remains to be seen, though, what other issues HUD
will tackle under the Biden-Harris Administration, given the many challenges facing renters and
homeowners as a result of the pandemic.
277. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946), repealed, revised, and reenacted by Act of June 25, 1948,
Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869.
278. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
279. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
280. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A)–(B).
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In a decision issued shortly after disability was added to the FHA as a
protected class, a HUD administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found a condominium
association in violation of the FHA because it engaged in “delaying tactics” and
“stalling and dilatory conduct” that had the effect of a denial; it “just never ruled
upon the [reasonable modification] request.” 281 The condominium association
failed to take action on the homeowner’s modification request to install a
wheelchair lift and wooden walkways and failed to made accommodations to
association policies from November 1989 until the homeowner’s death in March
1992. 282 The ALJ found the delays to be “for all practical purposes” a denial. 283
Multiple district and circuit courts have since found that unreasonable
delays in responding to requests for reasonable accommodation or modification
constitute constructive denial in violation of the FHA. 284 Focusing on the
effects of failure to timely respond to a request, the Fifth Circuit stated that “an
indeterminate delay has the same effect as an outright denial.” 285 In Groome
Resources Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 286 a group home applied for a zoning variance
to operate a dwelling for five unrelated individuals in a single family zone. 287
Three months later, when the parish still had not issued a decision on the
reasonable accommodation request, the group home filed suit in federal district
court, alleging monetary damages related to the rescheduling of closing on the
property. 288 When the parish challenged the suit for lack of ripeness, both the
district court and Fifth Circuit found the three-month delay with no timeline
for resolution to be a denial under fair housing law. 289
The Eleventh Circuit referred back to Groome Resources in a subsequent
case, similarly explaining that “the denial of an accommodation ‘can be both
actual or constructive, as an indeterminate delay has the same effect as an
outright denial.’” 290 In United States v. Hialeah Housing Authority, 291 a tenant
281. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev. ex rel. Guard v. Ocean Sands, Inc., HUDALJ 04-900231-1, 12, 26, 32 (Sept. 3, 1993).
282. Id. at 27.
283. Id.
284. Astralis Condo. Ass’n v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 620 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir.
2010); Scoggins v. Lee’s Crossing Homeowners Ass’n, 718 F.3d 262, 272–75 (4th Cir. 2013); Groome
Res. Ltd., L.L.C. v. Par. of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 199–200 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hialeah
Hous. Auth., 418 F. App’x 872, 878 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Town of Garner, 720 F. Supp.
2d 721, 729 (E.D.N.C. 2010).
285. Groome Res., 234 F.3d at 199.
286. 234 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2000).
287. Id. at 196.
288. Id. at 197.
289. The court said that “[w]hile never formally denying the request, the Parish’s unjustified and
indeterminate delay had the same effect of undermining the anti-discriminatory purpose of the
FHAA.” Id. at 199–200.
290. United States v. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App’x 872, 878 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Groome
Res., 234 F.3d at 199).
291. 418 F. App’x 872 (11th Cir. 2011).
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with mobility issues requested transfer to an accessible unit without stairs. 292
However, the PHA only offered the household inaccessible units with stairs
without indicating when it would offer an accessible unit. 293 Between when the
tenant explicitly made the reasonable accommodation request and when he filed
his HUD complaint, almost a year had passed with no accommodation from the
PHA. 294 On review, the Eleventh Circuit found that failure to grant the
accommodation for an accessible unit “for an indefinite period of time
constitute[d] at least a constructive refusal to provide the accommodations.” 295
The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed that “[a] denial of a request need not be
explicit, but rather may be treated as a ‘constructive’ denial based on the
decision maker’s conduct.” 296 In Scroggins v. Lee’s Crossing Homeowners Ass’n, 297
the Fourth Circuit considered a family’s reasonable accommodation request to
allow their son to use an all-terrain vehicle on community paths because it was
difficult for his manual or electric wheelchair to navigate the unpaved paths. 298
The homeowners association waited sixteen months before responding to the
request or requesting additional information. 299 While the case was ultimately
dismissed on the merits, the court found the delay of sixteen months to
constitute a constructive denial, reiterating the principle that unreasonable
delays in responding to a reasonable accommodation request are denials under
law.
Other courts have similarly found unreasonably long delays in responding
to reasonable accommodation requests to violate the Fair Housing Act. In
Astralis Condominium Ass’n v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 300 the complainants had requested designated parking spaces close
to the building entrance to accommodate their physical disabilities, but the
condominium association issued no final decision for over a year. 301 The First
Circuit affirmed the agency finding of discrimination due to the delay. 302 In
United States v. Town of Garner, 303 a group home operator requested a reasonable
accommodation to allow a group home in an area zoned for families. 304 The trial
court denied the town’s motion to dismiss, stating that it “may have
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
2010).
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 874.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 874–75.
Id. at 878.
Scoggins v. Lee’s Crossing Homeowners Ass’n, 718 F.3d 262, 271 (4th Cir. 2013).
718 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 267.
Id. at 268.
620 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2010).
Astralis Condo. Ass’n v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 620 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir.
Id. at 69–70.
720 F. Supp. 2d 721 (E.D.N.C 2010).
Id. at 722–23.
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constructively denied the reasonable accommodation request . . . [by] failing to
act” for over a year and a half after the group home submitted its reasonable
accommodation requests. 305
Because fair housing law already views a housing provider’s unreasonable
delay in responding to a reasonable accommodation or modification request to
be a constructive denial, it is logical to suggest that PHA failure to timely
respond to a request to add or remove a household member from household
records could similarly be treated as a denial. Federal fair housing law was
enacted to promote fair housing for people who historically had difficulty
securing housing due to discrimination. 306 Women and people of color, historic
targets of housing discrimination and some of the first protected classes under
the FHA, are disproportionately likely to be poor, disproportionately likely to
be eligible for subsidized housing, and are in fact overrepresented in subsidized
rental housing. 307 It therefore makes sense to apply strategies from fair housing
law to subsidized housing.
2. Constructive Denials in Other Areas of Law
Much like constructive denials in fair housing law, it is well established in
other areas of law that the requirement to exhaust administrative or legislative
remedies before seeking judicial review is not an impediment to judicial review
if the entity reviewing a request delays an unreasonable length of time. 308 Under
the doctrine of administrative exhaustion, someone wishing to challenge an
agency decision must generally complete the agency review process before filing
a case in court. 309 Reasons for the doctrine of administrative exhaustion include
judicial economy and recognition that agencies have expertise in their areas of
law that is important to the administration of justice. 310 However, there are
exceptions to the doctrine. 311 Relevant to the instant issue, courts have
305. Id. at 729.
306. See 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
307. Ewert, supra note 51, at 97–101.
308. Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561, 587 (1989); Smith
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 590–92 (1926); Taylor v. Barnett, 105 F. Supp. 2d 483, 486
(E.D. Va. 2000).
309. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938); see Kenneth Culp Davis,
Administrative Law Doctrines of Exhaustion of Remedies, Ripeness for Review, and Primary Jurisdiction: 1, 28
TEX. L. REV. 168, 168 (1949); Robert C. Power, Help Is Sometimes Close at Hand: The Exhaustion Problem
and the Ripeness Solution, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 547–48 (1987).
310. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–94 (1969); Davis, supra note 309, at 169; Power,
supra note 309, at 554–56.
311. Exceptions include if the administrative remedy is plainly inadequate, see U.S. Alkali Exp.
Ass’n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 210 (1945), if there are issues of constitutionality of legislation
that the agency action cannot address, see Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534,
540 (1958), and if complying with the agency procedures would be futile, see Mont. Nat. Bank of
Billings v. Yellowstone Cty., 276 U.S. 499, 505 (1928). See generally Davis, supra note 309, at 174–87
(noting exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine); Power, supra note 309, at 557–66 (same).
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repeatedly found that unreasonable delays by the agency or legislative body
warrant relaxing of the exhaustion doctrine. 312
The banking context presents one such example. In a case involving the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”), which
administered deposit insurance for savings and loan institutions until replaced
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 313 the Supreme Court
determined that the indeterminate response period precluded the need for
administrative exhaustion before seeking relief in court. 314 The relevant statute
required the FSLIC to respond to creditor claims within six months and to issue
a decision allowing the claim in full or in part, disallowing the claim in full or
in part, or retaining the claim for further review. 315 However, the regulations
set no time limit for how long the FSLIC had to make a final decision after it
retained a claim for further review. 316 In Coit v. Federal S&L Corp., 317 a creditor’s
claim had been pending in the “further review” stage before the FSLIC for
thirteen months with no final decision. 318 The Supreme Court found that “lack
of a reasonable time limit in the current administrative claims procedure
render[ed] it inadequate” since the FSLIC could delay claims indefinitely, thus
denying creditors “their day in court.” 319 The Court held that the creditor did
not need to show administrative exhaustion before filing a claim in court. 320
Another area of law in which courts have found exhaustion unnecessary in
the face of unreasonable delays is telecommunications law. In Smith v. Illinois
Bell Telephone Co., 321 a telephone company had requested that the state
commerce commission implement a new rate schedule, alleging that the prior
rate schedule did not allow it to cover its operating expenses. 322 The commission
did nothing about the request for two years. 323 The U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the phone company’s claim that the failure to respond to its request
was an unconstitutional taking, saying that “[p]roperty may be as effectively
taken by long-continued and unreasonable delay” and that the injured party “is
not required indefinitely to await a decision . . . before applying to a federal
312. Coit Indep. Joint Venture, 489 U.S. at 587; Smith, 270 U.S. 591–92; Taylor, 105 F. Supp. 2d at
486.
313. Julia Kagan, Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federal-savings-and-loan-insurance-corporation-fslic.asp
[https://perma.cc/3VNM-KZZ3] (last updated Jan. 30, 2021).
314. Coit Indep. Joint Venture, 489 U.S. at 587.
315. Id. at 586.
316. Id.
317. 489 U.S. 561 (1989).
318. Id. at 586.
319. Id. at 587.
320. Id.
321. 270 U.S. 587 (1926).
322. Id. at 590.
323. Id. at 591.
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court for equitable relief.” 324 The Supreme Court then determined that the
phone company did not have to show legislative exhaustion before seeking relief
in court. 325
A third area of law in which courts have found the administrative
exhaustion doctrine to not bar judicial review because of administrative delay is
prisoners’ rights. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) 326 states that
“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
[section 1983 of this title], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies
as are available are exhausted.” 327 In Taylor v. Barnett, 328 the Eastern District of
Virginia heard a case in which an inmate who was diagnosed with AIDS
challenged a change in his medication that led to serious physical and mental
side effects, including “rashes, drowsiness, discolored urine, numbness in his
feet, loss of appetite and mental stress.” 329 The Virginia Department of
Corrections never processed his administrative grievances so he was unable to
proceed with administrative review and instead filed a complaint in federal
court. 330 The court refused to dismiss the claim for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies because, if true, the inmate’s allegations about the
prison’s failure to respond to his grievances showed that he had “exhausted his
‘available’ administrative remedies as required by the PLRA.” 331 If the prison
would not respond to the inmate’s attempts to participate in the appropriate
administrative process, then there was nothing else he could do
administratively, and he could proceed with court action to challenge the
treatment per the federal statute.
This review of fair housing and administrative exhaustion case law shows
that courts recognize the harm people experience when an entity fails to provide
a timely response to requests for action. Further, courts understand that it is
unfair to punish claimants for not using an administrative process if the entity
administering the process is the reason for the delay. Even when statutes or
regulations are silent as to how long a reasonable response period is, courts are
capable of doing case-specific analysis to determine when a delay becomes a
constructive denial. The cases discussed above often involved complex
requests—determining reasonable rates for telecommunications services that
affected a large community, appropriate treatment for a serious illness, and
zoning variances that would potentially affect many neighbors. Despite the
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 591–92.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1366 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1997e).
Id. § 7, 110 Stat. at 1371 (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
105 F. Supp. 2d 483 (E.D. Va. 2000).
Id. at 485.
Id. at 485–86.
Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
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complexity of these issues, courts were able to review the facts and determine
whether delays were reasonable. These cases had far reaching impacts yet were
well within the ability of the courts to decide.
The instant issue—whether to allow a particular subsidized tenant to add
or remove a particular household member—is far simpler and affects only a
fraction of the subsidized households. 332 When determining whether to allow
the addition of a new person, the PHA merely needs to conduct a criminal
background check and screen their finances. These can be accomplished quickly
using various credit reporting and background check programs. Already, PHAs
conduct these screenings on a daily basis. When responding to a request to
remove a former household member from the records, the PHA only needs to
redetermine household income without the former member’s income included.
Given the limited issues involved and ease with which the PHAs can obtain the
necessary information, it is reasonable for courts to treat an unreasonable delay
as a constructive denial and allow the tenants to challenge the constructive
denial using existing due process procedures.
In Groome Resources, the Fifth Circuit found a three-month delay in
responding to a reasonable accommodation request for a zoning variance to be
a constructive denial. Surely, it is reasonable to expect PHAs to respond to
simple requests to add or remove household members from PHA records faster
than that. While this Article does not necessarily advocate for a one-size-fitsall approach to what is a reasonable time for a PHA response, 333 it seems
entirely reasonable for courts to find PHA delays of more than two months (and
possibly even less given HUD’s expectations for private housing providers
receiving subsidies) to be constructive denials, triggering administrative and
judicial review rights.

332. The number of households PHAs subsidize varies by community. Some programs are small.
For example, the Housing Authority of Tulare County in California administers about 700 public
housing units and 2,950 HCVP units. See Housing Authority of the County of Tulare, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOUS. & URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/
mtw/tulare [https://perma.cc/P2NE-M8R6] (last updated Sept. 8, 2020). Larger PHAs provide
assistance to tens of thousands of households. The Housing Authority of Baltimore City administers
about 7,200 public housing units and 20,200 HCVP vouchers. See Housing Authority of Baltimore City,
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/
programs/ph/mtw/baltimore [https://perma.cc/9M74-UG5J]. The Chicago Housing Authority is even
larger, providing public housing and voucher assistance to over 63,000 households. See Chicago Housing
Authority, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian
_housing/programs/ph/mtw/chicago [https://perma.cc/WM5L-GAX8]. Regardless of whether the
PHA is small or large, the percentage of households requesting to add or remove household members
is likely a small percentage of the overall consumer base, so processing these change requests constitutes
a small proportion of a PHA’s overall work.
333. For example, this author recognizes that many PHAs experienced delays in processing all
sorts of requests during the unprecedented COVID-19 shutdown of 2020 or that requests submitted
during the winter holidays might take longer to process because of staff vacations and office closures.
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Solution 2: Self-Certification Combined with Subpoena Power

A second procedural problem that PHAs must address is the requirement
that a tenant produce third-party verification of a former household member’s
new address before removing the former household member from PHA records.
It should be sufficient for tenants to submit a statement certifying that their
household composition has changed. Then they would not need to obtain often
inaccessible third-party records. Indeed, during the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare instituted a “declaration
method” of establishing eligibility for public benefits, relying on the applicant’s
or recipient’s declaration and seeking external corroboration only when the
declaration was “incomplete, unclear, or inconsistent.” 334 Further, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was required to assist the
applicant or recipient in obtaining third-party verification records if such
records were necessary and was responsible for obtaining those records if the
applicant or recipient could not do so. 335 Unfortunately, the Nixon
Administration rolled back the simplified verification program as part of its
campaign to root out alleged fraud in means-tested benefits programs. 336
Welfare recipients came under increased scrutiny in the 1970s and 1980s,
when concern over welfare fraud became frenzied. 337 While there were three
high profile instances of individual women engaging in welfare fraud by
collecting benefits under multiple aliases, a government report from 1979 found
that medical providers overcharging Medicaid and Medicare were a much
bigger problem than fraud in welfare. 338 Further, a recent study of welfare
recipients found that the interviewees “considered it a welfare ‘violation’ to
spend welfare money wastefully or to spend it on oneself rather than on one’s
children.” 339 The idea that most means-tested public benefits recipients are
successfully gaming the system for personal gain is not supported by
evidence. 340 However, by the 1990s, governmental concern over welfare fraud
334. Bennett, supra note 98, at 2186; see also Determination of Eligibility for Public Assistance
Programs, 33 Fed. Reg. 17,189 (1968) (proposed Nov. 8, 1968); Part 206—Application, Determination
of Eligibility and Furnishing Assistance—Public Assistance Programs, 35 Fed. Reg. 8784, 8785 (1970)
(“Applicants and recipients will be relied upon as the primary source of information in making the
decision about their eligibility.”).
335. 35 Fed. Reg. 8785 (“The agency will help applicants and recipients provide needed
information, as necessary, or will obtain the information for them if, because of physical, mental, or
other difficulties, they themselves are unable to provide it.”).
336. 38 Fed. Reg. 22,005, 22,006–07 (1973); Bennett, supra note 98, at 2186.
337. GUSTAFSON, supra note 186, at 32–35.
338. Id. at 33–34.
339. Id. at 151.
340. Examining benefits for people in economic crisis reveals that the incidence of recipient fraud
is low. The federal government has determined that less than 1% of households receiving SNAP
benefits are, in fact, ineligible, and the payment accuracy rate for SNAP benefits was over 96% in 2011.
What Is FNS Doing to Fight SNAP Fraud?, U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV. (June
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had reached a fevered pitch. When Congress passed welfare reform in 1996, it
required states to implement some sort of fraud control policy. 341
The response to concerns about fraud was “verification extremism,” in
which agencies administering public benefits demand stricter documentation of
eligibility than the authorizing statutes or regulations require. 342 Examples of
verification extremism include requiring the production of Social Security cards
when program regulations require only that applicants list a valid Social
Security number, requiring birth certificates or photo identification cards when
the regulations do not require them, or requiring that applicants have
statements notarized when the regulation only requires an applicant make a
written statement. 343 These requirements impose real burdens on low-income
individuals or people experiencing homelessness, who have little money for
paying replacement fees and often limited transportation options for getting to
agency offices if they lose documents. PHAs requiring third-party records like
a former household member’s new lease or utility bill is another example of
verification extremism that poses challenges to program participants.
Given the ongoing hysteria about fraud in means-tested benefits programs
and the entrenchment of verification extremism, 344 it is unlikely that PHAs will
27, 2019), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/integrity/fraud-FNS-fighting [https://perma.cc/38VEMTZ2]. Further, in the case of SNAP overpayments, only about 11% of the overpayments in the 2016
fiscal year were due to recipient fraud; the overwhelming majority of overpayments stemmed from
agency error or recipient error. RANDY ALISON AUSSENBERG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45147, ERRORS
AND FRAUD IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP) 11–13 (2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45147.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E8H-NY2S]. With Medicaid, most
fraudulent activity is committed by health care providers in their billing, not by low-income individuals
submitting fraudulent applications. Clifford J. Levy & Michael Luo, New York Medicaid Fraud May
Reach into Billions, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/18/nyregion/newyork-medicaid-fraud-may-reach-into-billions.html [https://perma.cc/6UPP-HHQU (dark archive)].
In the unemployment insurance program (which is not a means-tested benefit), the national improper
payment rate for the 2020 reporting year was 9.17%. Unemployment Insurance Payment Accuracy by State,
U.S. DEPT. LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/unemployment-insurance-payment-accuracy
[https://perma.cc/9SY6-GKVG]. However, the rate of improper payments due to applicant fraud was
much lower at 3.23% from 2019 to 2020. U.S. DEP’T LAB. EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., CHART –
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IMPROPER PAYMENT RATES, 1 (2020), https://oui.doleta.gov/
unemploy/pdf/UI_Improper_PaymentRates.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YCP-AB7P].
341. GUSTAFSON, supra note 186, at 56–57, 63–65.
342. Bennett, supra note 98, at 2159; see also Timothy J. Casey & Mary R. Mannix, Quality Control
in Public Assistance: Victimizing the Poor Through One-Sided Accountability, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
1381, 1385–86 (1989).
343. Bennett, supra note 98, at 2166–67.
344. A recent study of IRS data shows that the federal government audits low-income taxpayers
applying for the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”) at a higher rate than wealthy taxpayers and that
over the past thirty years audit rates for low-income taxpayers increased by one-third while audit rates
for the wealthiest taxpayers decreased by ninety percent. The hyper focus on low-income taxpayers
seems driven by the fear that EITC recipients are more likely to commit fraud than other taxpayers.
David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. More Likely To Audit the Poor and Not the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16,
2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/16/business/irs-more-likely-to-audit-the-poor-and-not-therich.html [https://perma.cc/CA4J-3QWG (dark archive)].
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do away with the third-party record requirement. The requirement likely stems
from a fear that subsidized tenants will lie about household composition, saying
that a household member has left when they in fact have not. Still, adopting an
approach based on self-certification would be consistent with other housing
assistance programs. For example, the home mortgage interest deduction and
similar tax breaks are based on taxpayer self-reporting unless the household is
audited due to suspected fraud, when the government might then request
corroborating records. 345 The federal government and PHAs should take a
similar approach to subsidized housing tenants adjusting their household
composition records—relying on the tenants’ self-certification unless there is
some legitimate, household-specific reason for suspecting a particular individual
engaged in fraud. If evidence suggested fraud, a more in-depth examination of
household composition might then be warranted.
This solution would be better for tenants but still allow PHAs recourse if
they determined that participants engaged in fraud. A PHA could terminate
the participant from the program and could pursue an overpayment recovery,
either through the agency (increasing the rent owed for future months if the
tenant stays in the public housing or HCVP program) or the courts (a money
judgment if the tenant is no longer in the program). As noted earlier, the
difference in rental assistance between when a former household member’s
income is included or not included is small from the PHA’s perspective but
significant for the household. 346 Given that the tenants bear a great burden if
the rent is set incorrectly high and are likely ill-equipped to represent
themselves in legal challenges to correct government agency action, 347 PHAs
should take steps to make the process to update records easier. Self-certification
is a reasonable approach.
However, if PHAs insist on third-party documentation before updating
household composition records, the federal government must authorize
subpoena power to enable the tenants to obtain those necessary third-party
documents. Congress already authorized subpoena power under the federal
Administrative Procedure Act, 348 which allows people with matters pending

345. Bach, Poor Support / Rich Support, supra note 205, at 535.
346. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
347. Even with the requested third-party verification, PHAs often do not adjust rent or update
records promptly. An investigative report of the Housing Authority of the City of Annapolis
documented the experience of various subsidized tenants, including Chermire Gladden, who worked
as a school bus driver and part-time at a cleaning company. Ohl et al., supra note 90. Despite providing
current paystubs showing a change in her hours, the PHA did not adjust her rent for six months, suing
her repeatedly for unpaid rent before the district court ruled in Ms. Gladden’s favor. Id. The PHA
ultimately credited her account the $1,128 she had been overcharged for that period, an insignificant
amount of money to the PHA but very significant to Ms. Gladden. Id. While Ms. Gladden was
fortunate to obtain free counsel from a legal services program, many other tenants are not so lucky.
348. Specifically, the APA directs that
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before federal agencies to subpoena both individuals and records to support
their case.
Congress can and should similarly add subpoena power to the statutes
governing how PHAs administer public housing and the HCVP. Doing so
would enable tenants to access third-party records like leases, utility bills, and
other documents establishing new residence of former household members.
Subpoena power would similarly enable tenants to present testimony from
witnesses who would not voluntarily appear at agency hearings or disclose
otherwise confidential information, such as emergency shelter staff who could
testify about a former household member staying at a shelter instead of the
subsidized housing unit. Then, subsidized tenants like Ms. Harris would be able
to obtain the third-party verification PHAs claim is necessary to adjust
household composition records.
The solutions proposed in this Article—treating unreasonable delays in
PHA responses as constructive denials and relying on self-certification
combined with subpoena power to prove household composition changes—
would allow subsidized tenants to more easily update composition records and
challenge PHA inaction. As a result, subsidized tenants would have more
control over their family life. This control is essential for protecting their
fundamental right to privacy, family formation, and decisional autonomy—all
integral values protected under the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Whether PHA delays in responding to requests to change household
composition and requirements to produce inaccessible third-party records are
motivated by animus towards and distrust of the low-income tenants (consistent
with government action throughout U.S. history) or bureaucratic negligence
(institutions being slow to evolve once patterns are established), the effects are
the same. 349 Subsidized tenants—who are disproportionately Black women—
are harmed when they cannot form the family units they want. As private and

[a]gency subpenas authorized by law shall be issued to a party on request and, when required
by rules of procedure, on a statement or showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of
the evidence sought. On contest, the court shall sustain the subpena or similar process or
demand to the extent that it is found to be in accordance with law. In a proceeding for
enforcement, the court shall issue an order requiring the appearance of the witness or the
production of the evidence or data within a reasonable time under penalty of punishment for
contempt in case of contumacious failure to comply.
5 U.S.C. § 555(d).
349. As one scholar recently noted, “We have created a caste system in this country, with African
Americans kept exploited and geographically separate by racially explicit government policies.
Although most of these policies are now off the books, they have never been remedied and their effects
endure.” ROTHSTEIN, supra note 42, at xvii.
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public institutions examine the role they play in perpetuating systemic racism,
is it imperative that HUD and PHAs similarly evaluate and correct
unnecessary, harmful policies that impact low-income tenants’ fundamental
rights.
Within a week of taking office, President Biden issued a memorandum to
the Secretary of HUD ordering the agency to examine its policies and redress
ones that were discriminatory. 350 In it, he acknowledged that “[o]ngoing legacies
of residential segregation and discrimination remain ever-present in our
society.” 351 He further stated that the FHA’s mandate to affirmatively further
fair housing requires not only that the government refrain from discrimination,
but also “take actions that undo historic patterns of segregation and other types
of discrimination and that afford access to long-denied opportunities.” 352
For Black lives to truly matter, Black families must be afforded the same
protections as other families. This includes the fundamental right to privacy,
family formation, and decisional autonomy. Given the critical role that
subsidized housing plays in supporting low-income families, who are
disproportionately families of color, the solutions proposed in this Article would
go a long way toward promoting and protecting those fundamental rights.

350. See Joseph R. Biden Jr., Memorandum on Redressing Our Nation’s and the Federal Government’s
History of Discriminatory Housing Practices and Policies, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 26, 2021), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/26/memorandum-on-redressingour-nations-and-the-federal-governments-history-of-discriminatory-housing-practices-and-policies/
[https://perma.cc/9R2M-BEU6].
351. Id.
352. Id.
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